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CAUSAL COMPARISONS
ROBERT N. STRASSFELD *
Focusing on the multiple meanings of the statement "A was a more important
cause of C than was B, " Professor Strassfeld considers the feasibility of compara-
tive causation as a means of apportioning legal responsibility for harms He con-
cludes that by combining two different interpretations of "more important
cause"--judgments of comparative counterfactual similarity and the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act approach of comparative responsibility-we can effectively
make causal comparisons and avoid the effort to compare such incommen-
surables as the defendant's fault under a strict liability standard and the plain-
tiff's fault for failure to exercise reasonable care
I. THE PROBLEM OF COMPARATIVE CAUSATION
T has long ceased to be timely news that the citadel of contributory
negligence has fallen.' Comparative negligence or fault has won a
crushing victory over the principle of contributory negligence as a com-
plete defense in tort.' By the mid-1980s, forty-four states, Puerto Rico,
and the Virgin Islands had adopted some form of comparative
negligence.
As is often the case, administering the peace has proven to be as hard
as winning the battle. Implementation of comparative negligence has
forced courts and legislatures to consider a variety of issues and compli-
cations.' One of these issues is the basis of apportionment, or the "what
* Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. B.A., Wesleyan
University, 1976; M.A., University of Rochester, 1980; J.D., University of Virginia 1984.
I am grateful to Susan Helper, Peter Junger, and William Marshall for their helpful com-
ments and to Sally Walters for her research assistance. I also thank Heidi Emick for
extraordinary secretarial support.
1. Cf. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn. L
Rev. 791, 794-98 (1966).
2. That victory has left its share of doubters in its wake. See Wassell v. Adams, 865
F.2d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.); Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liabil-
ity, 2 J. Legal Stud. 323, 346-47 (1973). For a discussion of the reasons why comparative
negligence came to supplant contributory negligence when it did, see Fleming, Foreword:
Comparative Negligence At Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 Calif. L. Rev. 239, 239-44
(1976); Wade, Comparative Negligence-Its Development in the United States and Its
Present Status in Louisiana, 40 La. L. Rev. 299, 299-309 (1980). Between 1908 and 1941,
there was a mini-boom in legislation establishing comparative negligence, followed by a
quiescent period until the 1970s. For a discussion of these earlier periods, see G. White,
Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History 164-68 (1980).
3. See V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence 3 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1990). In 1986,
Schwartz announced that the "march of comparative negligence" had become "a stam-
pede." 1d. As he has since noted, that stampede has come to a screeching halt. See id. at
1 (Supp. 1990). The holdout states are Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, South Car-
olina, Tennessee, and Virginia. See id. at 25. The District of Columbia has also retained
the contributory negligence rule. See i.
4. See generally id. (discussing the gamut of comparative negligence issues); H.
Woods, Comparative Fault (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1991) (same). For a more compressed
discussion of some of these issues, see M. Franklin & R. Rabin, Cases and Materials on
Tort Law and Alternatives 385-96 (4th ed. 1987).
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to compare" question. The usual response has been to compare the
tortfeasor's negligence to the plaintiff's fault or'misconduct.5 Where the
plaintiff's claim rests on a theory of strict liability, however, the task of
comparison creates a dilemma. The Supreme Court of California, for
example, acknowledged that: "[t]he task of merging the [concepts of
comparative fault and strict products liability] is said to be impossible,
that 'apples and oranges' cannot be compared, that 'oil and water' do not
mix, and that strict liability, which is not founded on negligence or fault,
is inhospitable to comparative principles." 6
As a solution to this dilemma, some commentators have advocated
shifting the focus of the comparison in strict products liability cases, or
perhaps in all cases, from the relative fault of the parties to their relative
causal contributions.' The Uniform Comparative Fault Act ("the Uni-
form Act") retains an emphasis on the relative fault of the parties, but it
also requires the factfinder to consider the causal relationship between
each party's conduct and the harm suffered.' At least sixteen states have
also adopted either a comparative causation rule for some or all cases or
the Uniform Act's approach of a blended inquiry into comparative fault
5. See V. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 29, 293-94. Similarly in cases involving contri-
bution among multiple tortfeasors, the usual approach is to compare their relative de-
grees of negligence.
6. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 734, 575 P.2d 1162, 1167, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 385 (1978) (Richardson, J.). Justice Jefferson dissented from the metaphor as
well as from the decision to import comparative fault analysis into strict products liabil-
ity. After all, we can compare apples and oranges, or make them into fruit salad. He
suggested that the apportionment task delegated to the jury was closer to that of compar-
ing "a quart of milk.., and a metal bar three feet in length." Id. at 750, 751, 575 P.2d at
1178, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 396 (Jefferson, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part).
7. See Gershonowitz, Comparative Causation as an Alternative to, Not a Part of,
Comparative Fault in Strict Products Liability, 30 St. Louis U.L.J. 483, 507-15 (1986)
[hereinafter Gershonowitz, Comparative Causation]; Gershonowitz, What Must Cause
Injury in Products Liability?, 62 Ind. L.J. 701, 729-32 (1987) [hereinafter Gershonowitz,
Products Liability]; Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in
Products Liability Cases, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 723, 725 (1974). Aaron Twerski also advo-
cates comparative causation, but he does so as a solution to problems of causal uncer-
tainty. See Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging Doctrine
of Comparative Causation, 29 Mercer L. Rev. 403, 413-14 (1978) [hereinafter Twerski,
Many Faces]; Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liabil-
ity, 10 Ind. L. Rev. 797, 820 (1977). He writes that "[c]omparative fault presents to juries
the mechanism for compromising difficult cause-in-fact questions." Id. at 828.
8. Section 2(b) of the Uniform Act states: "In determining the percentages of fault,
the trier of fact shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and
the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed." Unif.
Comparative Fault Act § 2(b), 12 U.L.A. 41, 48 (Supp. 1991). The comments to section
2(b) indicate that in referring to considerations of the causal relation between the conduct
and the harm, the Act contemplates proximate causation. The comment states:
[T]he fact-finder will also give consideration to the relative closeness of the
causal relationship of the negligent conduct of the defendants and the harm to
the plaintiff. Degrees of fault and proximity of causation are inextricably mixed,
as a study of last clear chance indicates, and that common law doctrine has
been absorbed in this Act.
Id. at 48 comment (emphasis added).
CA USAL COMPARISONS
and comparative causation, 9 while the law in four others is unclear but
suggests the possibility that the comparison is supposed to be wholly or
partly causal.
10
This Article considers the feasibility of causal comparison." It focuses
9. These states are: ALASKA: Atwater v. Matanuska Elec. Ass'n, 727 P.2d 774,
777 n.4 (Alaska 1986); IDAHO: Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 111 Idaho 536, 540-42,
726 P.2d 648, 652-54 (1986); ILLINOIS: Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 97 Il1. 2d 104,
116-19, 454 N.E.2d 197, 202-04 (1983); Erickson v. Muskin Corp., 180 I. App. 3d 117,
122-23, 535 N.E.2d 475, 478 (1989); IOWA: Iowa Code § 668.3(3) (1987) (adopting Uni-
form Comparative Fault Act); KANSAS: Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439,
452-53, 618 P.2d 788, 798 (1980); Sandifer Motors, Inc. v. City of Roeland Park, 6 Kan.
App. 2d 308, 316-18, 628 P.2d 239, 246-48 (1981); KENTUCKY: Hilen v. Hays, 673
S.W.2d 713, 720 (Ky. 1984); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.182 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1991) (adopting Uniform Comparative Fault Act approach); LOUISIANA: Watson v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 469 So. 2d 967, 973-74 (La. 1985); MICHIGAN: Mich.
Comp. Laws § 600.6304(2) (1991) (incorporating Uniform Comparative Fault Act ap-
proach); MINNESOTA: Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 393-94 (Minn.
1977); Winge v. Minnesota Transfer Ry., 234 Minn. 399, 403, 201 N.W.2d 259, 263
(1972); MONTANA: Cash v. Otis Elevator Co., 210 Mont. 319, 330-32, 684 P.2d 1041,
1047 (1984); NEW HAMPSHIRE: Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802,
809-14, 395 A.2d 843, 848-50 (1978); NEW YORK: Abergast v. Board of Educ., 65
N.Y.2d 161, 162-69, 480 N.E.2d 365, 366-71, 490 N.Y.S.2d 751, 752-57 (1985); TEXAS:
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 424-29 (Tex. 1984); General Motors
Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 352 (Tex. 1977); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rein. Code Ann.§ 33.001 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (shifting apportionment inquiry from focus on compara-
tive factual causation to focus on proximate cause notions underlying comparative re-
sponsibility); UTAH: Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1303-04 (Utah
1981); WASHINGTON: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.22.015 (1988) (adopting Uniform
Comparative Fault Act); WEST VIRGINIA: Reager v. Anderson, 371 S.E.2d 619, 625
& n.1 (W. Va. 1988) (dictum); cf Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 158-60 (3d
Cir. 1979) (adopting comparative causation approach for strict liability claims arising
under Virgin Islands law).
10. See Jackson v. Frederick's Motor Inn, 418 A.2d 168, 173 & n.l, 174 (Me. 1980)
(under Maine Comparative Negligence Act, relative fault of the parties is not the only
factor to be considered; court echoed approach to apportionment set forth in the Com-
missioner's Comment to section 2 of the Uniform Fault Act, but ultimately framed jury's
task as that of making an apportionment it deems "just and equitable"); Earl v. Consoli-
dated Aluminum Corp., 714 S.W.2d 932, 936 (Mo. 1986) (speaking in terms of"compar-
ative fault," but stating that "where there is evidence that the conduct of both parties
combined and contributed to cause damage, the factfinder should not be precluded from
comparing the respective contributions toward such causation made by each"); Suter v.
San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 162-64, 406 A.2d 140, 146-47 (1979)(giving no clear direction on method of apportionment); Dixon v. Four Seasons Bowling
Alley, Inc., 176 N.J. Super. 540, 544, 424 A.2d 428, 429 (1980) (noting that jury appor-
tioned damages in negligence claim on basis of percentage of negligence attributable to
each party, but determined allocation in strict liability claim on basis of extent that "each
party's conduct contributed... to the happening of the accident"); Mauch v. Manufac-
turers Sales & Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 348 (N.D. 1984) (adopting comparative cau-
sation in strict liability cases); N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03.2-03 (Supp. 1991) (speaking of
comparisons of "amount of contributing fault" and having unclear effect on Mauch).
11. This Article assumes that legal doctrines provide a basis for identifying certain
conditions as causes, and it considers only ascriptions of weight to such designated
causes. The basis for selecting from a set of conditions certain acts or events as causes,
either in law, or generally, is beyond the scope of this Article. The literature on the
distinction between causes and conditions is vast. A good starting point is H.LA. Hart &
T. Honor, Causation in the Law 11-13, 33-34 (2d ed. 1985).
19921
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on tort law where some courts use causal comparison either to assign
shares of responsibility and to apportion damages under a comparative
fault regime, or to resolve the related problem of contribution among
joint tortfeasors. While the vehicle for this discussion is a problem of
apportionment of damages in tort, a practicable system of causal appor-
tionment would benefit other areas of law where rules of contribution
require us to apportion responsibility among wrongdoers. I2 The need for
a workable method of causal apportionment arises also in the determina-
tion of damages in securities fraud cases. 3 Moreover, in such diverse
areas of the law as intentional interference with contractual relations,
defamation, malicious prosecution, and retaliatory eviction for attempted
enforcement of a housing code, courts confronted with defendants who
have acted out of a mixture of bad and privileged motives often apply a
"dominant" or "primary" motive standard to determine whether the act
gives rise to liability.14
We cannot assign greater weight to certain causes unless we can mean-
ingfully say that a particular cause of an effect is more important than
another cause of the same effect. Yet a widely held view is that such
statements of causal weight are meaningless. Part II addresses the pri-
mary focus of this Article. It examines the possible meanings of the as-
sertion that A was a more important cause of C than was B. It first
considers the argument that statements of relative causal importance are
causal nonsense, but it suggests by counterexample the inadequacy of
that position. It then examines five possible meanings of claims of
greater causal importance.
Talk of causal importance tends to conflate two different legal concep-
tions of causation: factual causation and proximate cause.' 5 Factual
causation seeks to describe what actually happened and to fix the causal
candidate's role in bringing about a particular harm. The proximate
cause inquiry considers the legal consequences of someone having tor-
tiously caused a harm. It asks whether that person should be held legally
accountable for the harm.16 Factual causation purports to be descriptive
in the most Rankean sense, while the proximate cause determination is
normative or policy-laden. 7 All but the last interpretation of greater
12. See Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic
Theory, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1399, 1399 & n.4 (1980) [hereinafter Rizzo & Arnold, Causal
Apportionment].
13. See SC A. Jacobs, Litigation and Practice Under Rule lOb-5 § 260.03[f][i]-[iii]
(2d ed. 1991).
14. See Weber, Beyond Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A New Approach to Mixed
Motive Discrimination, 68 N.C.L. Rev. 495, 507-14 (1990). Weber advocates adoption of
a similar approach in employment discrimination cases.
15. Cf Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69, 71 (1975) (identifying three concepts of "cause,"
including factual cause, proximate cause, and "causal link").
16. Factual causation asks "who dunnit?" Proximate cause asks "who cares?"
17. Leopold von Ranke described the historian's task as reconstructing the past "wie
es eigentlich gewesen" (as it actually was). See Preface to Histories of Romance and Ger-
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causal importance analyzed in Part II conceive of judgments of causal
importance as objective and factual. Whether or not factual causation is
really "a factual, empirical inquiry that can be ... kept distinct from the
policy issues in tort adjudication,"'" the ostensibly factual analyses of
causal importance described below tend to shade into normative judg-
ments, and the realms of factual and proximate cause are apt to blend
together.
Part III attempts to bring some order to the confusion of these multi-
ple meanings of "more important cause." It argues that unhappily each
interpretation is deficient in some manner, but it proposes that in those
cases where causal comparison is nonetheless desirable we can achieve
our best results by combining two of the approaches described in Part II:
the exercise of judgments of comparative counterfactual similarity, and
the Uniform Act approach of comparative responsibility.
Finally, I have simplified my task in two ways. First, I do not address
the issue of joint and several liability. 9 Second, instead of considering
how we might quantify shares of causal responsibility, I consider the sim-
pler question of whether we can make comparisons of relative causal
weight at all. I choose the latter question both because our inability even
manic Peoples, in The Varieties of History 57 (F. Stern ed. 1956). Prosser notes that
proximate cause "is not a question of causation, or even a question of fact." W. Prosser,
Handbook of the Law of Torts 244 (4th ed. 1971). It is, instead, "essentially a question of
whether the policy of the law will extend the responsibility for the conduct to the conse-
quences which have in fact occurred." Id&
18. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 1735, 1803 (1985) [hereinafter
Wright, Causation]. Contra Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 Stan. L Rev. 60
(1956) (arguing that normative policy considerations permeate factual causation
determinations).
19. In other words, in my discussion of apportionment I assume that all relevant
actors are amenable to suit and able to pay their share, and I ignore the issue of who
should bear the risk that they are not.
Joint and several liability has been one of the primary targets of the so-called tort
reform movement. See S. 640, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 306 (1991) ("Product Liability
Fairness Act"). For an introduction to the debate about joint and several liability, see
Komhauser & Revesz, Sharing Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors, 98 Yale LJ. 831
(1989); Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection and Modification of the Common Law Rule
of Joint and Several Liability, 62 Wash. L. Rev. 233 (1987); Wright, Allocating Liability
Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability
for Actual Harm and Risk Exposur 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1141 (1988) [hereinafter
Wright, Allocating Liability]; and the debate between Richard Wright and Aaron Twerski
in Colloquy, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1125 (1989).
In the context of comparative fault, a number of courts have retained joint and several
liability. See e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 582-83,
578 P.2d 899, 901, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 184 (1978) (holding that adoption of comparative
negligence rule does not warrant abolition of joint and several liability doctrine), over-
ruled by 1986 ballot initiativ Cal. Civ. Code § 1431-1431.5 (West Supp. 1992); Coney v.
J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 124, 454 N.E.2d 197, 206 (1983) (retaining joint and
several liability in comparative negligence cases, in keeping with a majority of jurisdic-
tions). For a discussion of joint and several liability under comparative fault, see V.
Schwartz, supra note 3, at § 16.4; H. Woods, supra note 4, at § 13.4; McNichols, Judicial
Elimination of Joint and Several Liability Because of Comparative Negligence-A Puzzling
Choice, 32 Okla. L. Rev. 1 (1979).
1992]
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to say that A was a more important cause than B would obviate any need
for a more sophisticated mechanics of apportionment, and because I be-
lieve that no such sophisticated mechanics of apportionment is achieva-
ble. While I conclude that it is possible and, in some instances, desirable
to make causal comparisons, I am convinced that any system of causal
apportionment is bound to be rough and inexact.
Yet for all its imprecision, causal apportionment is our most useful
tool for apportioning liability when we otherwise must compare such in-
commensurables as the defendant's "fault" under a strict liability stan-
dard and the plaintiff's "fault" for failure to exercise reasonable self-care.
Rough justice may be the best we can aspire to in cases calling for causal
apportionment, or indeed in any others.
II. THE MEANINGS OF "MORE IMPORTANT CAUSE"
Comparative causation presumes that talk about one cause being more
important than another is meaningful. Yet many commentators dispute
that it can be, and when courts and legislatures talk about comparative
causation their meanings are obscure. E0 In this section, I will unpack the
statement: "A was a more important cause of C than was B." I will
show that a difficulty for comparative causation is not that the statement
is meaningless, but that it suggests multiple inconsistent meanings.
A. Causal Nonsense
Under a widely held understanding of causation, any attribution on
causal grounds of greater importance to one necessary cause than to an-
other is nonsensical.21 According to this view, the distinguishing mark of
causes is that they are necessary for the occurrence of a result. Claims of
20. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text; cf. Nagel, Some Issues in the
Logic of Historical Analysis, in Theories of History 373, 382-83 (P. Gardiner ed. 1959)
("most historians do not appear to associate any definite meaning with their statements of
relative importance, so that the statements often have only a rhetorical intent, from
which no clear empirical content can be extracted").
21. See Howard v. Allstate Ins. Co., 520 So. 2d 715, 720 (La. 1988) (Dennis, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of General Motors,
292 Or. 590, 602-03, 642 P.2d 624, 630-31 (1982); 4 F. Harper, F. James, Jr. & 0. Gray,
The Law of Torts § 22.16 (2d ed. 1986); J. Fleming, The Law of Torts 247 (6th ed. 1983);
W. Prosser, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on The Law of Torts
§ 67, at 474 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser & Keeton]; Aiken, Proportioning Compar-
ative Negligence-Problems of Theory and Special Verdict Formulation, 53 Marq. L. Rev.
293, 296-97 (1970); Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. Legal Stud. 419, 450
(1979); Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of Comparative Negligence, 43 Mo. L.
Rev. 431, 445 (1978); Honor6, Causation and Remoteness of Damage, in 11 International
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Torts, Pt. 1, § 7-34 (A. Tunc ed. 1983); Kaye &
Aickin, A Comment on Causal Apportionment, 13 J. Legal Stud. 191, 206 (1984); Kel-
man, The Necessary Myth of Objective Causation Judgments in Liberal Political Theory,
63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 579, 579 (1987); Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under Compara-
tive Fault Laws-An Analysis of the Alternatives, 40 La. L. Rev. 343, 345 & n.9, 346 (1980);
Twerski, Many Faces, supra note 7, at 413; Wright, Allocating Liability, supra note 19, at
1146, 1194 (rejecting attribution of greater importance to some causes rather than others
[Vol. 60
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relative causal importance therefore imply that one cause was more nec-
essary than another. But necessity is indivisible. It "does not admit of
degree."' 22 And those attributes of necessity apply equally to necessary
causes. Thus, according to Richard Pearson: "[c]ausation is not a rela-
tive concept; it exists or it does not, and if it does exist one does not speak
of 'degrees' of causation. ' 23 Similarly, Jacques Barzun and Henry Graff
dismiss attempts to identify a "paramount" cause as "impl[ying] a mea-
surement that we cannot in fact make" and "foolishly ap[ing] the chemi-
cal formula by which a compound requires several elements in stated
proportions."24 They approvingly quote Edward Lucas White's state-
ment that "if ... it took malaria-bearing mosquitoes and the spread of
Christianity to undo the Roman Empire, the mosquitoes were as neces-
sary as the Christians and neither is paramount to the other."'
This unity theory of causal necessity has intuitive appeal. If we con-
sider, for example, the conception of an embryo, we would accord equal
importance to the ovum and sperm. Neither can produce the effect with-
out the other, and, consequently, neither can be assigned greater causal
importance. This intuition is also cloaked with philosophical respectabil-
ity. J.S. Mill wrote that "no 'condition' of a result has a 'closer relation'
to that result than another, since each is 'equally indispensable to the
production of the consequent.' "26 J.L. Mackie has given modem expres-
sion to this idea in writing that "[i]f two factors are each necessary in the
circumstances, they are equally necessary."27
in terms of their contribution to factual causation but advocating causal weighting in
terms of the proximate causation notion of comparative responsibility).
22. Martin, On Weighting Causes, 9 Am. Phil. Q. 291, 291 (1972) [hereinafter Martin,
On Weighting Causes].
23. Pearson, supra note 21, at 346.
24. J. Barzun & H. Graf, The Modern Researcher 189 (4th ed. 1985).
25. Id. (citing E. White, Why Rome Fell (1927)).
26. J.S. Mill, A System of Logic 214 (8th ed. 1874), quoted in Martin, On Weighting
Causes, supra note 22, at 291.
27. J.L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation 128 (paperback
ed. 1980) [hereinafter J.L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe]. Quoting an earlier
work, Mackie further states:
Each of the moments in the minimal sufficient condition, or in each minimal
sufficient condition, that was present can equally be regarded as the cause.
They may be distinguished as predisposing causes, triggering causes, and so on,
but it is quite arbitrary to pick out as "main" and "secondary," different mo-
ments which are equally nonredundant items in a minimal sufficient condition,
or which are moments in two minimal sufficient conditions each of which
makes the other redundant.
Id. n.21 (quoting Mackie, Causes and Conditions, 2 Am. Phil. Q. 245, 253 (1965) [herein-
after Mackie, Causes and Conditions]); see also Nagel, supra note 20, at 382 (incorrectly
stating that natural scientists do not engage in causal weighting and adding "it is easy to
dismiss the question of whether there is any objective basis for such gradations of vari-
ables, with a peremptory denial on the ground that, if a phenomenon occurs only when
certain conditions are realized, all these conditions are equally essential, and no one of
them can intelligibly be regarded as more basic than the others"); cf. L. Stone, The
Causes of the English Revolution 1529-1642, at 58 (1972) ("The great methodological
gain from breaking the problem down into distinct categories of preconditions, precipi-
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Yet if we banish all talk of relative causal importance, we deny our-
selves the possibility of making many meaningful causal comparisons.
We might wish to say, for instance, that Lenin's participation in the Bol-
shevik Revolution was a more important cause of its success than was
Stalin's, or that the absence of a skilled labor force is a more important
cause of economic backwardness than is limited natural resources. 28 Or,
we might have reason to say that James is happier today than he was last
week partly because he earned an A on his torts exam, but more because
his love life has improved.29 Indeed, we often talk as if at least some
causal comparisons are meaningful. That we do suggests that we must
draw on some intelligible basis for assigning causal weight that looks be-
yond the equivalence suggested by causal necessity's apparent indivisibil-
ity. We must therefore explore further the possible meanings of the
phrase that A was a more important cause of C than was B.
B. Class- Wide Causal Comparisons
One noncontroversial use of causal comparisons is their application to
classes of events. Thus, the assertions that broken homes are a more
important cause of juvenile delinquency than is poverty, or that driver
negligence is a more important cause of automobile accidents than are
mechanical defects are meaningful, and presumably verifiable or falsifi-
able.30 This sense of more important cause, however, has little relevance
to tort law, which focuses on the causation of singular events, not on
classes of events. As Raymond Martin notes:
tants and triggers is that the historian is relieved of the futile, and intellectually dishonest,
task of trying to arrange all the causes in a single rank order."). Nevertheless, Mackie
and Nagel each recognize intelligible meanings of the idea that A was a more important
cause of C than was B, and Stone makes weighted causal judgments within his three
categories of preconditions, precipitants, and triggers, although he declines to make
weighted cross-category comparisons. See J.L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe,
supra note 27, at 128-29; Nagel, supra note 20, at 383-84; L. Stone, supra note 27, at 58-
145.
28. These examples are from Martin, On Weighting Causes, supra note 22, at 291, and
Nagel, supra note 20, at 383.
29. This example is based on one from R. Martin, The Past Within Us: An Empirical
Approach to Philosophy of History 80 (1989) [hereinafter R. Martin, The Past Within
Us].
30. The examples are Nagel's. See Nagel, supra note 20, at 383-84. As Nagel's dis-
cussion indicates, assertions of this type are susceptible to more than one meaning. They
might mean that the joint presence of A and B are not necessary for the occurrence of C,
although either A or B is a necessary cause in conjunction with certain other conditions
and that C is more often caused by A than by B. See id. at 383-84. However, they might
mean that A and B are not jointly necessary and that the "relative frequency with which
C occurs when the condition A is realized but B is not is greater than the relative fre-
quency of C's occurrence if B is realized but A is not." Id. at 384 (emphasis added); see
also Hook, Illustrations, in Social Science Research Council, Theory and Practice in His-
torical Study: A Report of the Committee on Historiography 108, 114 (Bulletin 54 1946)
("A condition is more decisive than others when events of this type take place more




It would be curious, if not downright wrong, to claim that driver negli-
gence was a more important cause of some particular accident than
was mechanical failure, merely because both were a cause of the acci-
dent in question and the frequency with which driver negligence has
been a cause of automobile accidents is greater than the frequency with
which mechanical failure has been a cause of automobile accidents. If
there were such a sense of "more important," one could weight the
causes of a particular automobile accident, once he knew what they
were, without knowing any of the other details of the accident.
3
'
Nevertheless, just such an approach has been advocated by various
proponents of "probabilistic causation."' 32 Primarily, probabilists have
focused on the problem of causal uncertainty, which they regard as en-
demic. They argue that a deterministic approach to causation fails to
account for the hard epistemological reality that our evidence of causa-
tion is necessarily probabilistic, not absolute. In the place of tort law's
traditional tests of causation, they describe causation in terms of the con-
duct's predicted causal potency, or risk creation.3 3
Probabilistic causation, however, also has importance for comparative
causation. Some of its proponents have argued that the causal potency
inquiry should be used to apportion damages. This argument was first
made by economists Mario Rizzo and Frank Arnold.' Like the corn-
31. Martin, On Weighting Causes, supra note 22, at 292 (emphasis in original); see
also Hammond, Weighting Causes in Historical Explanation, 43 Theoria 103, 105-06
(1977) ("it is not possible to derive criteria for the weighting of causes of particular events
from the weighting of causes of events of that type").
32. See Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68
Va. L. Rev. 713, 759-69 (1982) [hereinafter Robinson, Multiple Causation]; Robinson,
Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk 14 J. Legal Stud. 779 (1985)
[hereinafter Robinson, Probabilistic Causation]; Robinson, Risk Causation, and Harm in
Liability and Responsibility: Essays in Law and Morals 317 (R. Frey & C. Morris eds.
1991) [hereinafter Robinson, Risk]; Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure
Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 851, 851-87 (1984).
Probabilistic causation has gained widespread support among the legal economists. See
Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics; and Proof. Pruning
the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 1001, 1005 n.17 (1988)
[hereinafter Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk].
33. These arguments are outside of the scope of this Article. Richard Wright has
been the principal critic of probabilistic causation. See Wright, Actual Causation m
Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Economic Analysis, 14 J. Legal Stud. 435 (1985);
Wright, Causation, supra note 18, at 1813-26; Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk,
supra note 32, at 1042-67; see also Kelman, supra note 21, at 608-17 (criticizing
probabilists' approach); Thomson, Remarks on Causation and Liability, 13 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. 99 (1984) (critically analyzing decline of actual causation requirement).
34. See Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment, supro note 12, at 1402-15; Rizzo &
Arnold, Causal Apportionment: Reply to the Critics, 15 J. Legal Stud. 219, 220-24 (1986)
[hereinafter Rizzo & Arnold, Reply to Critics]; Rizzo, The Imputation Theory of Proxi-
mate Cause: An Economic Framework 15 Ga. L. Rev. 1007, 1009-20 (1981). For techni-
cal and theoretical criticisms of Rizzo and Arnold's apportionment formulas, see Kaye &
Aickin, supra note 21, at 193-207; Kelman, supra note 21, at 608-17; Kruskal, Terms of
Reference" Singular Confusion About Multiple Causation, 15 J. Legal Stud. 427, 433-35
(1986); Robinson, Multiple Causation, supra note 32, at 759-67; Wright, Allocating Lia-
bility, supra note 19, at 1203-07, 1209-11.
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mentators discussed in section A, Rizzo and Arnold begin from the as-
sumption that one cannot weight necessary causes.35 They instead look
to risk creation, or, as they put it, to the "general harm-producing capac-
ities" of different causes to determine their relative importance.36 In
their effort to develop a "technology for the apportionment of tort dam-
ages," they generate a series of equations intended to represent the rela-
tive risk contribution of multiple causes to the production of a harm. "
The total risk produced by the causes (call them A and B)38 consists of
the risk of harm generated by each cause independently of the other and
the risk of harm produced by them synergistically.39 The first compo-
nent, the independent risk created by A and by B unaffected by the pres-
ence or absence of the other cause, can be represented by the following
formulas:
a = P(HIA) (1)
f3 = P(HIB) (2)
where H stands for the harm that resulted, and P(HIA) stands for the
probability of that harm's occurrence given A." The harm, H, may oc-
cur either when A or B acts alone, or when they duplicatively, but inde-
pendently, cause H. The probability of the duplicative independent risk
is ctI3. Thus the probability of H caused only by A or only by B is:
P(HA&B = (a-cl) (3)
P(HIB&A) = (13-cco) (4)
where A and B signify that A or B has not caused H. 4 The sum of
equations (3) and (4) is the nonduplicative independent risk. The total
probability of H resulting from the independent risk created by A and B
can be expressed as:
35. "[A] deterministic analysis is incapable of disentangling the relative importance of
causes. In those contexts in which each wrongful act is a necessary condition of the
harm, the marginal product of each would be the entire damage." Rizzo & Arnold,
Causal Apportionment, supra note 12, at 1408.
36. Id. They never, however, offer a justification for using this proxy to measure
causal weight in cases of joint causation.
37. Id. at 1400.
38. In order to limit the universe of causes Rizzo and Arnold adopt Hart and Ho-
nor6's screen to distinguish causes from conditions, and they argue that it has descriptive
power under alternative standards to designate certain acts as wrongful, and thus, candi-
dates for causal status. See id. at 1406-07. For a discussion of Hart and Honor6's ap-
proach, see infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
39. I will argue below that this first component, independently created risk, should, in
turn, be subdivided into two components. See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
40. In other words, these equations express conditional probabilities of H. Rizzo and
Arnold's version of the equations is somewhat more complicated. See Rizzo & Arnold,
Causal Apportionment, supra note 12, at 1409. I have adopted, instead, the simpler form
of these equations used by Wright, Allocating Liability, supra note 19, at 1197. See also
Kaye & Aickin, supra note 21, at 193 (equations (la) and (lb)); Kruskal, supra note 34,
at 428 (using similar equations).
41. These are essentially the same as Wright's equations (6) and (7). See Wright,
Allocating Liability, supra note 19, at 1198.
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P(HIA&B) = (a-a3) + (3-a ) + a3 (5).
We must still account for the synergistic effect of any interaction be-
tween A and B. We can represent the synergistic risk by the term s.43 If
the value of that term is positive, A and B synergistically increase the
total risk of harm beyond the independent risk that they create, while a
negative value indicates negative synergism. If the value is zero, A and B
do not interact synergistically. We can rewrite equation (5) to take ac-
count of synergism as follows:
P(HIA&B) = (a-ao) + (0-a) + a3 + s (6)"
Equation (6) represents the total risk of H created by A and B.
We can divide the total probability of harm H into three components:
the nonduplicative independent risk created by A and B, represented by
the first two terms of equation (6); the duplicative independent risk cre-
ated by A and B, represented by the term a3; and the synergistic risk
created by the two causes, represented by the term s. Rizzo and Arnold
apportion responsibility for the synergistic risk equally between A and B
on the theory that where both causes are necessary causes, and neither is
a sufficient cause, neither cause can be assigned greater weight than the
other.45 They apportion the remainder of the risk by the ratio of the
independent risks a and 13. A's share of the independently caused risk of
harm is ct/(ct+O3) times the value of that risk of harm, and B's share is
03/(a+13) times the same number.' Thus, under their approach we can
express the apportionment of risk as follows:
A's share = (ct/(ct+0)) [(a-aD3) + (0-aO3) + aO] + 0.5s (7);
B's share = (0/(ct+0)) [(a-cot) + (3-a3) + ao] + 0.5s (8). 7
Rizzo and Arnold's critics have found much to fault in their approach.
William Kruskal has noted that they assume the harm and wrongful acts
to be dichotomous; either the harm occurs or none does. Real harms,
however, often are occurrences within a polytomy or a continuum. a
42. Equation (5) is the same as Wright's equation (8a). See id. Rizzo and Arnold
express this total probability of H resulting from the independent risks, or, with the equa-
tion 8 = (a-c3) + (13-a13) + ao13, the "definitional joint probability." Rizzo & Ar-
nold, Causal Apportionment, supra note 12, at 1410 (equation (3)); Rizzo & Arnold,
Reply to Critics, supra note 34, at 222 (equation (1)).
43. Rizzo and Arnold represent the synergistic risk by the term -Y-8 where , repre-
sents "the actual joint probability" of H. Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment, supra
note 12, at 1410-11.
44. This is Wright's equation (9a). See Wright, Allocating Liability, supra note 19, at
1199.
45. This is the argument discussed supra in section A.
46. See Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment, supra note 12, at 1409, 1411.
47. Wright, Allocating Liability, supra note 19, at 1204 (equations (10) and (11)); see
Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment, supra note 12, at 1409-11; Kaye & Aickin, supra
note 21, at 199 (equation (6)).
48. See Kruskal, supra note 34, at 428. For example, a bullet may harmlessly miss its
intended target, miss the target who nevertheless suffers harm due to shock and fright, or
hit him causing any manner of injury ranging from a minor flesh wound to death.
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Even with these simplifying assumptions, however, we must make the
further questionable assumption that we can know the conditional
probabilities necessary for the apportionment calculations.49 Glen
Robinson has noted that by failing to account for unknown or natural
causes, the Rizzo and Arnold approach may assign responsibility to
known causes disproportionate to the marginal increments of risk that
they actually caused.5" Finally, some of their critics have argued that
they fail to justify the selection of their particular formula to measure
relative responsibility for risk creation rather than some alternative
formula, such as Kaye and Aickin's.51
Even if we set those criticisms aside, however, and accept equation (6)
as an adequate statement of the total risk of H, we cannot make compar-
ative fault and contribution determinations correctly according to the
Rizzo and Arnold apportionment formula. The apportionment problems
that we wish to resolve involve singular events that we know were caused
by both A and B acting either simultaneously or sequentially.52 Rizzo
and Arnold, however, look at the complete range of possible occurrences
of H, including those in which only A or only B caused the harm. When
apportioning causal responsibility in joint causation cases, there is no
reason to consider the first two terms in equation (6)," 3 which represent
the independent nonduplicative risk of H caused by A and B respectively.
Moreover, as Richard Wright notes, they fail to explain why they appor-
tion both ct-a3 and f3-a13 among A and B according to the ratio of
independent risks, since the first term represents risk produced only by A
and the second represents risk produced only by B. The first term,
ar-ct3, ought more appropriately to be attributed exclusively to A, and
49. See id. at 429, 430. Rizzo and Arnold contend that they need not know precise
conditional probabilities and can, instead, resort to "[r]ough estimates of relative likeli-
hoods." Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment, supra note 12, at 1409 n. 56. But cf
Kruskal, supra note 34, at 430 (discussing difficulties of making comparisons between two
imprecisely estimated numbers between zero and one). Nor do they say how these ap-
proximations are to be derived, other than to indicate that they need not always be a
matter of mere enumeration of actual frequencies and to refer to "[e]xpert testimony and
common sense" regarding "scientific and everyday knowledge." Rizzo & Arnold, Causal
Apportionment, supra note 12, at 1409 n.56; see also Rizzo & Arnold, Reply to Critics,
supra note 34, at 220 (defending approximations as more than a count of "actual frequen-
cies" and as representing "a degree-of-belief assessment").
50. See Robinson, Multiple Causation, supra note 32, at 760 n.149, 761-64.
51. Kaye and Aickin's approach is discussed in Kaye & Aickin, supra note 21. See
also Kelman, supra note 21, at 611-17 (criticizing Rizzo and Arnold's approach); Krus-
kal, supra note 34, at 430-31 and passim. (same); Wright, Allocating Liability, supra note
19, at 1203-07 (same). Rizzo and Arnold respond to Kaye and Aickin in Rizzo & Ar-
nold, Reply to Critics, supra note 34.
52. We at least believe that A and B caused H with a degree of certainty that permits
us to act as if we know that they both caused the harm. The use of an apportionment
formula to deal with the problem of causal uncertainty when we know that A and B were
present and that either or both sometimes causes H but we do not know the cause(s) of H
in a particular instance raises different sorts of questions.
53. (a-aO) + (1-aP3). See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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-cao ought to be attributed exclusively to B.1
Rizzo and Arnold apportion the remaining elements of risk--duplica-
tive independently caused risk and synergistic risk-in two different
ways. They apportion the term ct3, the duplicative independently caused
risk, according to the ratio of the independent risks. They apportion the
term s, the synergistic risk, equally between A and B. Here they have
things backwards. Of the remaining elements of risk, it is a1x that cannot
be apportioned on any justifiable basis other than equal shares, while the
synergistic risk may be apportionable unequally.
Rizzo and Arnold fail to justify their apportionment of (x0.s- As they
acknowledge, cxf3 represents those situations "where A caused harm and
B did as well." 56 In other words, (X3 represents instances of causal over-
determination where both A and B caused the harm and would similarly
have done so in the other's absence.57 Thus their causal contribution is
equal, and, since they are duplicative, neither alone made a difference.5"
54. See Wright, Allocating Liability, supra note 19, at 1205; cf. Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 433A(l) (1965) ("Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more
causes where ... there are distinct harms.").
55. For their attempted justification, see Rizzo & Arnold, Reply to Critics, supra note
34, at 222-24. Rizzo and Arnold propose the example of a person who dies after two
nonsynergistic gunshot wounds, one to his heart (A) and one to his brain (B). See Rizzo
& Arnold, Reply to Critics, supra note 34, at 223. They further propose that, while
wounds of type A are more potent than wounds of type B, "ex hypothesi, we cannot
determine which actually killed him in this case." L. Yet, while in their example we
cannot know whether the cause of death was A alone, or B alone, or A and B acting
duplicatively, they acknowledge that the term ct13 represents those instances where A and
B independently but duplicatively kill the victim. Thus, their assertion regarding a13 that
"[t]he fact that B also caused harm should not detract from A's causal potency," is cor-
rect, but besides the point. Id Let us accept for the moment the validity of their focus
on causal potency, as an expression of risk creation attributable to A and to B. As Rich-
ard Wright demonstrates, the problem with their approach is that it "ignores the distinct
natures of a - a3, f3 - t13, and a13," and it never adequately justifies apportioning each,
or for that matter any, of these three elements according to the ratio of the independent
risks. Wright, Allocating Liability, supra note 19, at 1205-06, 1209-10.
But the larger problem is the focus on the ex parte causal potency. In real tort actions,
other than those where the injury is risk creation, the issue of causal apportionment only
arises after the factfinder has concluded that A and B did cause the injury. Thus Rizzo
and Arnold's example, where "ex hypothesi, we cannot determine" which cause caused
the harm, and the analysis that flows from it are inapt.
56. Id. at 223. In this and other instances, Rizzo and Arnold slip into deterministic
talk about causation. They speak in terms of "A and B simultaneously but independently
kill[ing] the victim," not of the creation of overlapping risks. Id. Since I am addressing
instances where we know, or believe with sufficient certainty to act as if we know, that A
and B were causes of a particular harm (rather than causes of the risk of that harm), I am
happy to follow them in this direction.
57. There is a large body of literature that discusses causal overdetermination. For an
introduction, see H.L.A. Hart & T. HonorS, supra note 11, at 122-25, 235-49; J.L.
Mackie, The Cement of the Universe, supra note 27, at 43-47; Wright, Causation, supra
note 18, at 1775-81, 1791-98.
58. For a discussion of the difference between the questions "What contribution did A
make to event C?" and "What difference did A make in the occurrence of C?.", see Sober,
Apportioning Causal Responsibility, 85 J. Phil. 303, 304-05 (1988). We can see quite
clearly that each cause was equally important if we analyze duplicative causation under
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There is no sensible way to distinguish between them on causal grounds,
and the only rational apportionment that does not appeal to noncausal
considerations is one of equal shares.5 9
The synergistic harm, however, need not be apportioned equally. Be-
cause often A and B must interact to produce a harm that neither could
produce without the other, a flawed approach to apportioning liability
for synergistically caused harms will lead to significant misallocations of
liability.' Rizzo and Arnold's adoption of an "equal shares" approach
is compelled by their adherence to the idea that talk of comparative
causal weight of necessary causes is causal nonsense. Yet to say that two
causes were both necessary does not entail that they made an equal con-
tribution to the occurrence of an effect or that they were equally indis-
pensable to its occurrence. We must consider further whether we can
sensibly assign relative causal weights to different necessary causes.
C. Causes That Occasion Other Causes
Aaron Gershonowitz has argued that a primary factor in comparing
causes should be the relationship between them." He writes that A is a
more important cause of C than is B if A and B jointly caused C and A
also caused B or increased the likelihood of B's occurrence.62 He illus-
trates this interpretation of "more important cause" with a discussion of
General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 6 3 a case involving the conjunction of
defective product design and the plaintiff's product misuse.
In Hopkins, the plaintiff was injured when his pick-up truck unexpect-
edly accelerated and went out of control on a curve. The jury found that
the truck's carburetor was defectively designed and that the defect was a
"producing cause" of the accident. Prior to the accident, Hopkins had
experienced another episode of sudden acceleration caused by the defec-
tive carburetor. In response to the earlier incident, he replaced the car-
buretor with one of a different make, but reinstalled the original when its
replacement failed to perform well.' Unfortunately, he badly botched
Raymond Martin's second analysis of weighted causal statements. Under Martin's Anal-
ysis (D2), we would say that neither A nor B was a more important cause of H than the
other because, had either A or B not occurred, the same thing would have occurred (H).
See infra notes 96-129 and accompanying text.
59. I do not address the question whether liability should be joint and several. See
supra note 19 and accompanying text.
60. There will likely be many instances where all or most of the risk results from
synergistic interaction. See Kruskal, supra note 34, at 430.
61. See Gershonowitz, Comparative Causation, supra note 7, at 508-14; Ger-
shonowitz, Products Liability, supra note 7, at 729-32. Gershonowitz would couple this
approach with a consideration of each cause's relative contribution to the risk of injury.
See Gershonowitz, Comparative Causation, supra note 7, at 511; Gershonowitz, Products
Liability, supra note 7, at 730.
62. See Gershonowitz, Products Liability, supra note 7, at 729-30.
63. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). For Gershonowitz's discussion of this case, see Ger-
shonowitz, Products Liability, supra note 7, at 727, 730.
64. Gershonowitz's analysis rests on the assertion that the plaintiff replaced the car-
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the job. The defendant argued that Hopkins had altered its design in
eleven ways, constituting unforeseeable misuse, and the jury found that
the misuse was also a cause of the accident. The Texas Supreme Court
stated that if a product defect and unforeseeable consumer misuse are
both proximate causes of an accident, the factfinder must determine "the
respective percentages (totalling 100 percent) by which these two concur-
ring causes contributed to bring about the event."65
Under Gershonowitz's approach, the defect was the more important
cause because "'but for' the defect Mr. Hopkins would not have re-
moved the carburetor."66 Gershonowitz has not made the case for
ascribing causal importance in this manner. He has overstated the re-
sponsibility that cause A must bear for cause B when A is a cause of B.
His method is also subject to numerous counterexamples.
In Gershonowitz's description of Hopkins, the defective carburetor
(cause A) is a contingently necessary, but not sufficient, cause of Hop-
kins' misuse (cause B).6 7 Indeed, if it were the sole cause, we would ab-
solve Hopkins of any legal responsibility on the grounds that the
butchering of the carburetor was compelled and therefore not his act.68
Instead, we know that Hopkins also contributed to the mangling of the
carburetor. He did so by failing to recognize that the task required the
expertise and skill of an automobile mechanic, carelessly using improper
materials, failing to make necessary connections or to make them prop-
erly, and installing components backwards and otherwise incorrectly.
Both the product defect and Hopkins' carelessness were but-for causes of
the product misuse and, without knowing more about the events, there is
no clear reason to attribute greater causal responsibility to General Mo-
buretor because of the first episode of sudden acceleration. In his discussion of Hopkins,
Professor Twerski states that: "The reason for the replacement apparently had nothing
to do with the [first] [i]ncident but rather stemmed from Hopkins' desire to increase the
speed and efficiency of the truck." Twerski, Many Faces, supra note 7, at 408. His de-
scription of events follows that of the intermediate appellate court. See General Motors
Corp. v. Hopkins, 535 S.W.2d 880, 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), aff'd, 548 S.W.2d 344
(Tex. 1977).
65. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d at 352. For other reasons, the court affirmed the judgments
below in favor of plaintiff. See id.
66. Gershonowitz, Products Liability, supra note 7, at 730.
67. A contingently necessary cause is necessary under the particular circumstances
for the production of a particular effect, although the same effect could occur in its ab-
sence under other circumstances.
68. Of course, General Motors' marketing of its pick-up truck with a defective carbu-
retor cannot be the sole cause of the misuse (and of the accident). The misuse resulted
from the conjunction of numerous causes, including Hopkins' existence, his purchase of
the pick-up truck, the invention of the internal combustion engine, etc. But I am assum-
ing that we have agreed upon some method for distinguishing between causes and condi-
tions in tort law. My point is that, having identified the carburetor and the misuse as the
legally relevant causal candidates, we would relieve Hopkins of any responsibility for that
misuse if his only causal contributions to it were on the level of his existence and his
performing tasks that were completely compelled by the defendant's acts. His responsi-
bility would be akin to that of a sleeping defendant whose causal contribution to an as-
sault was that another defendant heaved his body onto the plaintiff.
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tors than to Hopkins. The locus of the causal comparison partly shifts
from the causes of C to the causes of B and C, but that alone does not
solve the question of relative causal importance.
Further, notwithstanding Gershonowitz's protestations to the con-
trary,69 his approach unduly emphasizes chronological priority in
weighting causes. While A will not necessarily be a cause of B just be-
cause it occurred first, later-in-time causes can never cause their prede-
cessors and, therefore, can never be more important causes under this
test of importance. Yet, if the interaction of A and B are necessary for
the occurrence of C, it is hardly obvious that an accident of chronology
should determine causal ranking. One might as sensibly say that B (the
temporally later cause) is more important than A because it completes A,
which would otherwise simply be "negligence in the air."7
Also, Gershonowitz's interpretation of more important cause cannot
deal with numerous counterexamples. For example, the Treaty of Ver-
sailles ending World War I, which stoked German despair and resent-
ment while leaving a power vacuum in Europe for Germany to fill, was a
but-for cause of Hitler's rise to power and aggressive foreign policy. Yet
few historians would argue that the resolution of World War I and the
international unbalance left in its wake were more important causes of
World War II than was Hitler.7
We encounter similar interactions among causes in tort cases involving
intervening causes where the first cause occasioned the second's occur-
rence. For example, in Hines v. Garrett,72 the defendant railroad negli-
gently let the plaintiff off a mile beyond her stop, even though she would
have to walk through an area notorious for criminal activity near night-
fall, and two men subsequently raped her as she made her way home. In
Brower v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad,73 the defendant's
train collided with the plaintiff's wagon, rendering the plaintiff too
stunned to protect his cargo from thieves. And in Watson v. Kentucky &
Indiana Bridge & Railroad,74 the defendant negligently caused a tank car
full of gasoline to derail and spill its contents. Subsequently, Duerr, a
69. See Gershonowitz, Comparative Causation, supra note 7, at 512.
70. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 341, 162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928) (quoting
F. Pollock, The Law of Torts 455 (11th ed.)).
71. Few, but not none. See A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War
(1961). But see H. Hughes, Contemporary Europe: A History 295 (3d ed. 1971) ("Con-
trary to the First World War, whose origins were extremely complex and responsibility
for which was spread among a number of nations, the Second World War was the work
of one man, Adolf Hitler.").
72. 131 Va. 125, 108 S.E. 690 (1921); cf Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Price, 106 Ga. 176,
32 S.E. 77 (1898) (taken beyond her station and brought by defendant to a hotel to spend
the night, plaintiff was injured when kerosene lamp in her room exploded).
73. 91 N.J.L. 190, 103 A. 166 (1918); cf Duce v. Rourke, 1 WWR 305 (NS) (Alta.,
Can. 195 1) (posing similar problem to Brower and reaching opposite result).
74. 137 Ky. 619, 126 S.W. 146 (1910); cf Stone v. Boston & Albany R.R. Co., 171
Mass. 536, 51 N.E. 1 (1898) (defendant's negligently oil-soaked platform set ablaze when
third party lit his pipe and carelessly threw match toward the platform).
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third party standing a block away from the tank car, lit a match--either,
according to conflicting testimony, to light a cigar or purposely to ignite
the gasoline-and caused an explosion that injured the plaintiff.
These cases do not raise the causal apportionment issue, although in
their determinations of whether or not defendant's act was a proximate
or a remote cause of the harm they do touch upon assessments of causal
importance. If we were to bring the rapists, the thieves, and Duerr into
the room with the defendants and ask the causal apportionment question,
however, we would certainly select them as more important causes of the
harms than the defendants in these three cases, even though the defend-
ants occasioned their harmful conduct.75
One might explain these counterexamples as instances where we over-
ride our usual principles of causal weighting because the second actor
intends the resulting harm, or is in some other sense a worse actor than
the first. Certainly that explanation fits each of these cases. If so, we
have already identified a qualification to Gershonowitz's interpretation of
most important cause.
Many other counterexamples, however, cannot be explained away so
simply in terms of the different treatment of intentional and merely negli-
gent acts. Often our causal intuition has been to assign greater impor-
tance to the later-in-time cause, to designate it as proximate and its
predecessor as remote, even though the two cannot be distinguished on
some scale of wrongfulness. An example is Stone v. Boston & Albany
Railroad,76 a case resembling Watson without the insinuation of inten-
tional wrongdoing by the intervening actor, Casserly. The court held
that Casserly's careless act of dropping a lit match on the defendant's oil-
saturated platform had made the defendant's conduct a remote cause of
the plaintiff's injury. While few courts today would decide Stone the
way the Massachusetts Supreme Court did in 1898, the decision reflected
a conventional application of the "last wrongdoer" rule, which treated
later-in-time causes as more important than prior occasioning causes.'
75. The one close case would be Watson, but not because of the temporal priority of
the defendant's actions. One reason that Watson presents a close case is our likely judg-
ment that there was a substantial chance that if Duerr had not lit his match someone or
something else would have provided the necessary spark. In other words, if Duerr's con-
tribution was easily replaceable, we could say that the defendant was a more important
cause. For a discussion of this concept of causal importance, see infra notes 146-49 and
accompanying text.
The Watson court focused on whether or not Duerr's act "was malicious, and done for
the purpose of causing the explosion." 137 Ky. at 633, 126 S.W. at 151. But see Stone.
171 Mass. at 542, 51 N.E. at 4 (finding defendant's maintenance of oil-soaked platform a
remote cause of harm when fire was started by the unintentional carelessness of a third
party). In this sense of causal importance Duerr's intent, not the physical character of
the act, which is the same regardless of his intent, determines the importance of his act
relative to the derailment. For a discussion of this meaning of more important cause, see
infra notes 138-51 and accompanying text.
76. 171 Mass. 536, 51 N.E. 1 (1898).
77. Notably, the plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that the defendant's negligence was
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Although the last wrongdoer rule fell into disrepute and twentieth cen-
tury commentators questioned its causal basis, nineteenth century law-
yers understood it as an expression of causal weighting.7"
The "last clear chance" rule, which negates the bar to recovery that
would result from the plaintiff's contributory negligence if the defendant
had the last clear chance to avoid the harm, similarly reflects an intuition
about causal importance that contradicts Gershonowitz's interpretation.
Like the related last wrongdoer rule, last clear chance has been fiercely
criticized by modem scholars, who have also challenged the causal un-
derpinnings of the rule.79 Yet the late nineteenth century treatise writers
who named and articulated the rule clearly understood it as a rule of
causal weighting that assigned greater importance to last-in-time
causes.
8 0
concurrent with that of Casserly in an effort to avoid application of the last wrongdoer
rule. See id. at 543-44, 51 N.E. at 4.
78. See F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Law of Negligence §§ 134-55 (1874). Whar-
ton wrote that: "[T]he spontaneous action of an independent will... cannot be said to
have been caused by us .... [S]o far as concerns my fellow-beings, their acts cannot be
said to have been caused by me, unless they are imbecile, or act under compulsion, or
under circumstances produced by me which give them no opportunity for volition." Id.
§ 138 (emphasis in original). Thus, in his search for "the" cause of a tortious harm,
Wharton made the categorical judgment that except in a few specified categories of cases
the most important cause of a later-in-time cause of a harm was the person whose action
constituted that cause and not some prior occasioning cause. In other words, he assumed
that if A and B jointly caused C and A also was a necessary condition for the occurrence
of B, the cause of B was nevertheless the person whose conduct we describe as B. He
further assumed that the last wrongful act, B, was the cause of the harm in question. He
wrote that the first wrongdoer should not be liable to third parties for "negligence which
[the second wrongdoer] alone was the cause of making operative." Id. § 134 (emphasis
added).
That Wharton's categorical judgments of causal importance were freighted with con-
cerns about protecting "m[e]n of means" from indefinite liability does not diminish the
potency of the last wrongdoer rule as a counterexample, albeit one with little extant doc-
trinal weight. Id. § 139. Wharton certainly was influenced by classical liberal notions of
individual responsibility, and one cannot gainsay that he feared that an expansive under-
standing of causation would lead to the plunder of capital. See id. §§ 139, 155. Whatever
the contribution of Wharton's world view and politics to his understanding of the last
wrongdoer rule, he understood the rule as a principle of causation, not as a policy choice,
although he also perceived policy benefits in the rule.
For twentieth century criticism of the rule, see 4 Harper, James & Gray, supra note 21,
§ 20.6, at 176-80; Eldredge, Culpable Intervention as Superseding Cause, 86 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 121, 124-25 (1937).
79. See, e.g., 4 Harper, James & Gray, supra note 21, at § 22.14; Prosser & Keeton,
supra note 21, at 462-64, 468 (stating that "[n]o very satisfactory reason for the rule ever
has been suggested"); G. Williams, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence: A Study of
Concurrent Fault 236-55 (1951) (criticizing judges' application of last-opportunity rule
on ground that the doctrine does not rest on law of causation or remoteness of damage).
80. For example, in an unsigned review of the Shearman and Redfield treatise, Wil-
liam Wills explained the rule in terms of proximate causation principles, stating that "the
law ... holds that person liable who was in the main the cause of the injury." Book
Review, 5 L.Q. Rev. 85, 87 (1889) (emphasis in original), quoted in G. White, supra note
2, at 47. In the fifth edition of their treatise, Shearman and Redfield explained the doc-
trine by stating that the person with the last clear opportunity to avoid the accident "is
the sole proximate cause of the injury." 1 T. Shearman & A. Redfield, A Treatise on the
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The point is not that we ought to substitute a last wrongdoer rule for
Gershonowitz's de facto first wrongdoer rule.81 It is, instead, that the
case has not been made on purely causal grounds for assigning greater
causal weight categorically either to occasioning causes or to later-in-
time causes that actualize the risk inherent in the circumstances created
by the earlier ones. The choice must rest on normative extracausal no-
tions of causal importance.
D. Judgments of Indispensability
Raymond Martin describes two other, related, interpretations of
"more important cause" in his work on causal weighting.8 2 The first of
these involves judgments of indispensability or recognition of substitutes.
It applies to some cases of causal overdetermination. Specifically, it ap-
plies where A and B were both insufficient causes of C and B was either
duplicative of D, which was also present and active and could have done
the work of B in its absence, or preempted the occurrence of D, which
was waiting in the wings to act and could have accomplished the same
effect as B.
Martin gives the following analysis of relative causal importance,
which he labels "(Dl)":
(Dl) A was a more important cause of P relative to 0 than was B if
(1) A and B were each a cause of P relative to 0, and
(2) A was necessary for P, and
(3) B was not necessary for P. 3
Martin's analysis requires some explication, and we need to define his
terms. His terms A, B, and P are "placeholders for expressions of the
form 'the fact that p,' where p is replaced by a full sentence in the indica-
Law of Negligence 154-55 (5th ed. 1898), quoted in G. White, supra note 2, at 47. Simi-
larly, Lord Denman explained the basis for the rule in causal terms in his dissenting
opinion in Radley v. London & N.W. Ry., 10 L.R.-Ex. 100, 108-09 (1875), quoted in G.
Williams, supra note 81, at 236. This justification for the rule soon provoked criticism.
See generally Schofield, Davies v. Mann: Theory of Contributory Negligence, 3 Harv. L
Rev. 263 (1889) (rejecting understanding of the rule grounded in terms of proximate
causation and explaining it instead in terms of public policy of creating proper incentives
for care). For discussions of the history of the last clear chance rule and its origins in
causal concepts, see generally 4 Harper, James & Gray, supra note 21, at § 22.12; G.
White, supra note 2, at 45-50. As Professors Harper, James and Gray point out, the
concept of contributory negligence also seems to have originally been grounded in similar
causal notions. See 4 Harper, James & Gray, supra note 21, at § 22.1.
81. In its treatment of the proximate cause questions raised by such cases as Watson
and Stone, the Second Restatement of Torts embraces neither a categorical last wrong-
doer nor first wrongdoer rule. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 447-49, 452 (1965).
82. See R. Martin, The Past Within Us, supra note 29, at 53-84; Martin, Causes;
Conditions and Causal Importance, 21 Hist. & Theory 53, 53 (1982); Martin, On Weight-
ing Causes, supra note 22, at 291. For discussions of Martin and elaborations of his
interpretations of causal importance, see Hammond, supra note 31; Pork, Assessing Rela-
tive Causal Importance in History, 24 Hist. & Theory 62, 63-65 (1985).
83. R. Martin, The Past Within Us, supra note 29, at 77.
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tive mood." 4 To take the example of our law student James, s5 we could
use (Dl) to describe his situation as follows: The fact that James' love
life has improved (A) is a more important cause of the fact that James is
happier today (P), than is the fact that he earned an A on his torts exam
(B).
But what of the term 0? Martin inserts it as a placeholder for a state-
ment expressing a "comparison-situation." 86 The comparison situation
is a situation resembling in most respects the one in which the event that
is to be explained (Martin's P) occurred, but in which P has not oc-
curred. It is a device through which we distinguish between mere condi-
tions, which exist under both situations, and causes, which are absent
from the comparison situation.87 We can make various comparisons to
the situation in which P has occurred. Probably the most common such
comparison that we make is a comparison of the state of affairs before
and after the occurrence of our suspected cause. 8 In the example above,
the comparison situation is James' state of mind a week earlier, and ad-
ding the term we might say: James is happier today than he was a week
ago, partly because he earned an A on his torts exam, but more because
his love life has improved.
Martin's notion of the comparison situation as a screen to separate
causes from conditions closely resembles H.L.A. Hart and Tony Ho-
nor6's abnormalist account of the cause/condition distinction.89 Like
84. Id
85. See supra text accompanying note 29.
86. R. Martin, The Past Within Us, supra note 29, at 77.
87. For a discussion of the distinction between causes and conditions, see infra note
89 and accompanying text.
88. Martin's comparison situation resembles J.L. Mackie's "control case" or "nega-
tive instance." J.L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe, supra note 27, at 56. Mackie
writes of the method of before-after comparison:
In an otherwise apparently static situation, one striking change (X) occurs, fol-
lowed shortly afterwards by another (Y). The situation before X occurred,
when equally Y did not occur, provides the control case or negative instance,
while the later situation, in which both X and Y occurred, provides the experi-
mental case or positive instance. And in a quite primitive and unsophisticated
way we can transfer the nonoccurrence of Y from the before situation to a sup-
posed later situation in which, similarly, X did not occur, and form the thought
which is expressed by the statement 'If X had not occurred, Y would not have
occurred', or, in other words, 'X was necessary in the circumstances for Y'.
Id. (emphasis in original).
89. See H.L.A. Hart & T. Honor6, supra note 11, at 33-41. Martin credits several
philosophers in addition to Hart and Honor6, with this "consensus account" of the
cause/condition distinction: C.J. Ducasse, J. Feinberg, S. Gorovitz, M. Scriven, R.
Shope, and M. White. R. Martin, The Past Within Us, supra note 29, at 59. To Martin's
list we can add J.L. Mackie. See J.L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe, supra note 27,
at 118-20.
Hart and Honor6 include an alternative screen in their discussion of causes and condi-
tions: "voluntary action intended to bring about what in fact has occurred." H.L.A.
Hart & T. Honor6, supra note 11, at 41. For an analysis criticizing Hart and Honor6's
treatment of the cause/condition distinction for failing to assimilate strict liability torts to
causal analysis and for importing noncausal normative analysis of the tortious conduct
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Hart and Honor6, Martin recognizes that the identification of a condition
as abnormal, and hence its selection as a cause, is context dependent.
Different conditions may be abnormal depending on the choice of com-
parison situation. Thus we may identify different causes of his current
happiness if we compare James' state of mind with Jenny's or with
James' state of mind a year or a decade ago." In tort law our choice of
comparison situation is norm dependent.
As an example of (Dl), we can imagine a forty-member faculty voting
on some matter at a faculty meeting. Professors X and Y vote in favor of
the proposal, which receives exactly the twenty-one votes necessary for
approval. Professor Z, who always votes converse to Professor Y, votes
against the proposal.91 He would have voted for it had Professor Y voted
against it, but a change in Professor X's vote would not have influenced
Professor Z's vote. Under this scenario we can say that Professor X's
vote for the proposal (A) was necessary for approval of the measure (P),
but that Professor Y's vote (B) was not. Therefore, A meets Martin's
criteria under (Dl) for being a more important cause of P than is B.9 2
and proximate cause aspects of a tort action into the causal inquiry, see Wright, Causa-
tion, supra note 18, at 1745-50; see also W. Dray, Philosophy of History 55-58 (1964)
[hereinafter W. Dray, Philosophy] (similarly identifying normative character of Hart and
Honors's approach); Dray, Causal Judgment in Attributive and Explanatory Contexts, 49
Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1986, at 13 (same).
90. See K Martin, The Past Within Us, supra note 29, at 60. Hart and Honor6 make
this point with their example of the man with a stomach ulcer who experiences a bout of
indigestion. The man's wife may blame his indigestion on his having eaten parsnips,
while his doctor would blame his stomach condition and relegate the parsnips to the
status of mere triggering cause. They attribute the difference to the wife's and doctor's
different formulations of the causal question. They write:
When things go wrong and we then ask for the cause, we ask this on the as-
sumption that the environment persists unchanged, and something has 'made
the difference' between what normally happens in it and what has happened in
it on this occasion. So the wife ... in asking what has given [her husband]
indigestion is in fact asking: 'What has given this man in his condition indiges-
tion when usually he gets by without it?' The doctor who gives the man's ulcer-
ated condition as the cause approaches the case with a wider outlook and a
different set of assumptions; .... His question ... is: 'What gave this man
indigestion when other men do not get it?'; for him what the man ate... is a
mere occasion-part of the normal conditions of most men's lives ....
... Thus, it is natural and correct, according to the context, to speak of the
eating of the parsnips, the ulcerated condition of the man's stomach, and his
failure to take a prescribed drug as the cause of his indigestion on a given
occasion.
H.L.A. Hart & T. Honor, supra note 11, at 36-37 (emphasis in original). For similar
statements of "the relativity of causes," see R.G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics
304-06 (1940); Malone, supra note 18, at 62-63.
91. This example is a variant of one used by Martin. See IL Martin, The Past Within
Us, supra note 29, at 77-78. He uses senators in his illustration. I have changed the
setting to a faculty meeting in the interest of believability.
92. Strictly speaking, neither Professor X's nor Y's vote was necessary for the propo-
sal to pass. Some faculty opponents of the proposal could have changed their minds and
votes. Depending on the faculty's by-laws passage might have required more yeas than
nays, but not an absolute majority of the full faculty, in which case the proposal might
have gained approval by the abstention or absence of some opponents. Martin states that
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We still need to modify (D1) slightly. First, A and B will only matter
for causal apportionment purposes if they describe "tortious conduct"
(broadly defined to include the plaintiff's fault). The question of appor-
tionment does not arise until we have identified two or more legally re-
sponsible actors under the normal tort rules defining the plaintiff's prima
facie case and the defendant's defenses.93 Second, we need not know
with certainty that A was contingently necessary and that B was not. As
elsewhere in the tort action, we will only require proof by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.
We can see an illustration of Martin's (D1) in a legal context in a
variation of a hypothetical first described by Leon Green. 4 Imagine that
a driver, B, runs into the plaintiff, A, without trying to use his brakes. B
was also driving too fast to stop. The brakes could not have stopped the
car under those circumstances anyway, since unbeknownst to B, they
were defective. C, who knew of the defect, had sold the car to B without
telling him of the defect. To convert the hypothetical into an example of
Martin's (Dl) we need only make A a pedestrian who was carelessly
dashing across the intersection against the light when B hit him. We can
then say that A's careless conduct was a necessary cause under the cir-
cumstances of his injury, but that B's negligent acts, though causes of the
accident, were not necessary under the circumstances, since the accident
would still have occurred in their absence due to C's tortious conduct.
Thus, under Martin's interpretation of "more important cause" ex-
pressed by (Dl), A's contributorily negligent act was a more important
cause of the accident than was B's speeding and failure to brake. My
examples of (Dl) are, however, necessarily contrived. Although real
cases that fit this analysis undoubtedly do arise, it is hard to imagine that
(DI) would resolve many real cases.
E. Judgments of Comparative Counterfactual Similarity
Because the universe of instances of (D I) is likely to be small,95 Martin
in speaking of causal necessity he intends the historian's concept of contingent necessity
or "necess[ity] under the circumstances." R. Martin, The Past Within Us, supra note 29,
at 77; see also W. Dray, Laws and Explanation in History 103-04 (1957) [hereinafter W.
Dray, Laws and Explanation] (historian's question is not whether a cause "was a gener-
ally necessary one for the events of the type to be explained," but rather whether it was
necessary to cause this event "in a determinate situation") (emphasis in original); Marc-
Wogau, On Historical Explanation, 28 Theoria 213, 226 (1962) (historical explanation
identifies "necessary condition[s] post factum").
93. See Wright, Causation, supra note 18, at 1741-58 (describing "tortious-conduct"
determination as a prerequisite for liability and as a screen for causal candidates). But see
Robinson, Multiple Causation, supra note 32, at 760 n.149, 761-64 (arguing that appor-
tionment must take account of nontortious environmental causes).
94. See Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 543,
569 n. 77 (1962). Green, in turn, credits the hypothetical to E. Wayne Thode.
95. Martin sees it as a description of most important cause that has limited use for
historians. See R. Martin, The Past Within Us, supra note 29, at 78.
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offers a second interpretation of most important cause, which he de-
scribes as follows:
(D2) A was a more important cause of P relative to 0 than was B if
(1) A and B were each a cause of P relative to 0, and
(2) either A was necessary for P or B was not necessary for P,
and
(3) had B not occurred, something would have occurred
which more closely approximates P than had A not
occurred.
96
The interpretation of Martin's terms remains the same as in (Dl), and
our modifications of (DI) also apply to (D2).9'
Analysis (D2)'s greater power as a means of ascribing causal weight
comes from its inquiry into counterfactual possibilities-imaginative al-
ternatives to the actual course of events-and the judgments of compara-
tive similarity that it requires. The concept of comparative similarity
unmoors the analysis of relative causal importance from a dichotomous
approach toward outcomes in which either the actual harm occurs or
none does.98 It enables the analysis to accommodate a range of
counterfactual alternatives in measuring the difference that each cause
made.
The pitfalls and terrors of Analysis (D2) also stem from its reliance on
counterfactual inquiry and comparative similarity judgments.
Counterfactuals are notoriously difficult and perplexing because we can-
not verify or falsify our counterfactual assertions.99 We cannot test them
by undoing the past and rolling the tape over again. As shown below,
comparisons of relative similarity are also difficult and ambiguous."
Yet the difficulties of the analysis are not insurmountable.
I propose to offer only an abbreviated defense of counterfactual inquiry
and discussion of how we might evaluate competing counterfactual
claims. 10 ' First, one should not assume that we could avoid the problem
96. Id.
97. Here, as there, the usual rules for tort liability apply and modify the analysis.
Tortious conduct is a prerequisite for a share of liability, and our conclusions must be
sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
98. For a criticism of this dichotomous approach, see supra note 48 and accompany-
ing text.
99. See, e.g., N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast 4 (4th ed. 1983) [hereinafter
N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction] ("a counterfactual by its nature can never be subjected to
any direct empirical test by realizing its antecedent"); Redlich, "New" and Traditional
Approaches to Economic History and Their Interdependence 25 J. Econ. Hist. 480, 484
(1965) (counterfactuals "are neither verifiable nor falsifiable").
100. See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
101. I have discussed these issues more completely in Strassfeld, If..: Counterfactu-
als in the Law, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 339 (1992). My understanding of counterfactuals
draws heavily on J.L. Mackie's analysis of conditionals, including counterfactual condi-
tionals. See J.L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe, supra note 27, at 29-58; J.L.
Mackie, Truth, Probability and Paradox: Studies in Philosophical Logic 64-117 (1973)
[hereinafter J.L. Mackie, Truth]; Mackie, Causes and Conditions, supra note 27. For a
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of counterfactuals if only we banished Analysis (D2). Steps (2) and (3) of
Analysis (Dl) also involve counterfactuals, as does any understanding of
causation that is grounded in a concept of causal necessity, since ascrip-
tion of causal status to event A implies the counterfactual that but for A,
events would have turned out differently."0 2
How, then, do we decide what would have occurred absent A or B?
Philosophers have offered various accounts of counterfactuals. a0 3  Of
these, the analysis that most nearly conforms to the law's use of
counterfactuals is J.L. Mackie's condensed argument or suppositional ac-
count.' °4 Mackie argues that a counterfactual introduces a supposi-
tion10 5 and then asserts something within the scope of the supposition. 106
Assertible counterfactuals rest on generalizations that we have confi-
dence are extendible to unrealized cases."07 They rely on "good induc-
tive evidence" that permits our inference drawing from the known onto
unrealized events.'
0 8
The kinds of evidence that will support the counterfactual statements
that are necessary for Analysis (D2) will vary with the facts of specific
cases. The possibilities include scientific laws, statistical, historical, soci-
ological, or psychological generalizations, and knowledge of an individ-
ual's dispositions and temperament, but a discussion of the kinds of
evidence and arguments that will support legal counterfactuals generally
is beyond the scope of this Article. 1°9 Instead, I wish to focus on the
question: evidence of what? The answer, I think, is that Analysis (D2)
different approach to counterfactuals in the law that draws on the work of David Lewis,
see L. Katz, Bad Acts and Guilty Minds: Conundrums of the Criminal Law 223-36
(1987).
102. See R. Martin, The Past Within Us, supra note 29, at 78-79; cf. W. Dray, Laws
and Explanations, supra note 92, at 104 (historical explanation requires "'think[ing]
away' the suggested cause in order to judge what difference its non-occurrence would
have made") (emphasis in original); Flew, History: Fact and Contrary-to-Fact, 56 Phil.
578, 578-79 (1981) ("The inescapable consequence is that every historian who wants to
say anything at all about what was or was not the cause or part cause of what ... cannot
but make assertions which carry contrary-to-fact implications.").
103. The philosophical literature on counterfactuals, and on conditionals more gener-
ally, is extensive. For two differing approaches that also contain critical surveys of the
literature, see D. Lewis, Counterfactuals (1973) [hereinafter D. Lewis, Counterfactuals]
(especially Chapter 3); J.L. Mackie, Truth, supra note 101, at 64-117. For a somewhat
dated, but helpful, survey, see Walters, Contrary-to-Fact Conditionals, in 2 Encyclopedia
of Philosophy 212 (1967).
104. See J.L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe, supra note 27, at 53-56, 199-203;
J.L. Mackie, Truth, supra note 101, at 92-119.
105. For example, I struck the match.
106. For example, the match lit. Translated to everyday language our counterfactual
statement would be: If I had struck the match, it would have lit.
107. To borrow an example from Nelson Goodman: "If that piece of butter had been
heated to 150 degrees F., it would have melted." N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction, supra note
99, at 4.
108. J.L. Mackie, Truth, supra note 101, at 118.
109. I discuss the kinds of evidence that legal factfinders might draw upon to frame
and evaluate counterfactuals in Strassfeld, supra note 101, at 407-15.
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requires evidence regarding either the divisibility of the harm suffered, or
the availability of substitutes for one or more causes.
In the simplest instances of divisible harm we have no need for Analy-
sis (D2). If ballistics tests tell us that Jones' bullet struck the plaintiff's
left ankle and Brown's bullet struck his right arm (and if the two injuries
do not cause additional synergistic harms), we simply assign the costs of
the distinct injuries to their respective causes. Similarly, where the
causes are fungible and the harm is cumulative, we can apportion liabil-
ity on the basis of the relative amount of force, pollution, or whatever
contributed by each cause. For example, if Acme Chemical dumped 200
gallons of magnesium sludge in a cave where Toxcorp dumped 800 gal-
lons of the same grade of magnesium sludge, we should assign 80% of
cleanup costs to Toxcorp and the rest to Acme.'1 o
In other instances, however, consequences are not so distinct or pre-
cisely apportionable, and divisibility is not so immediately apparent. Re-
call our law student, James. We say that the happy turn of events in his
love life is a more important cause of his current happiness than is his A
in torts. In other words, his improved love life produced a greater quan-
tum of his overall happiness than did his torts grade. His happiness is a
single intangible thing, a state of mind. We cannot identify that portion
of it that is attributable to each cause, as we can distinguish the ankle
wound from the arm wound in the shooters example above. Nor is it the
product of two causes that are fungible in all respects except amount.
Yet, a highly plausible example of (D2) is: the change in James' love life
was a more important cause of his current happiness than was his torts
grade, since had James not earned an A on his torts exam, his mood
would more closely approximate his current level of happiness than it
would had his love life not improved.11' We can assert this confidently
not because we can point to the portions of his happiness assignable to
each cause, or because we have some quantified sense of each cause's
potency, but because our self-knowledge and knowledge about others
tells us that it is so. We know this because we have learned to recognize
the sparkle in the eye, the lilt in the step, and the dreamy vacant look
that accompany the first rush of love, but so seldom follow a final grade
of A in a course.
The second sort of evidence relevant to Analysis (D2) is evidence of
available near substitutes for one of the causes. We have seen an illustra-
tion of this in the faculty vote example in the discussion of Analysis (D 1).
There we said that Professor X's vote in favor of a proposal was a more
110. This example assumes either that there are no economies of scale or diminishing
returns in the cleanup of additional units of magnesium sludge, or, more realistically, that
those savings or costs will be apportioned according to our 80/20 formula as part of the
overall cost.
I11. This works for weighting the causes of harms as well as the causes of benefits.
Consider: Fred is more unhappy today than he was a week ago, partly because he earned




important cause of its adoption than was Professor Y's vote, since there
was no substitute for Professor X's vote, but Professor Z would have cast
the vote necessary for the proposal's adoption had Professor Y opposed
it.
To identify A and B as causes of P is to say that A and B are each
necessary but insufficient members of a set of factors (A, B, ... ) that was
sufficient to cause P.112 Usually, however, there will be more than one
set of factors capable of producing the event P and even more sets of
factors capable of producing events that bear some resemblance to P.
Under Analysis (D2), A is a more important cause than B either if under
the circumstances the set (A, B, ... ) is more likely to produce P than the
set (B, A ... ), or if the set containing A is likely to produce an effect, P,
that more closely approximates P than does P2, the effect produced by
the set containing B. 13 Thus, this analysis of more important cause con-
siders how much of a difference A and B made in light of available substi-
tutes for one or both causes to accomplish P or something partly
resembling it.
A familiar example of this sort of causal weighting is the distinction
that historians draw between underlying or fundamental causes and trig-
gering causes. When an historian says, for example, that the assassina-
tion of Archduke Ferdinand at Sarajevo was not the "real" cause of
World War I, or that the shooting of demonstrators on the streets of
Paris was merely the triggering cause of the 1848 French Revolution, she
is saying that something very like these events would have occurred with-
out these immediate causes, and that other underlying causes were more
important. 
14
Stone v. Boston & Albany Railroad, in which the defendant's mainte-
nance of an oil-saturated platform at its railroad depot was deemed to be
a remote cause of a fire because of the intervening act of Casserly, who lit
his pipe and dropped the match on the platform, provides an apt illustra-
tion of how we could apply Analysis (D2) in a legal context to identify
the most important cause of an injury." 6 We can say that the defend-
ant's maintenance of an oil-saturated platform (A) was a more important
112. See Martin, On Weighting Causes, supra note 22, at 297-98; see also Wright, Cau-
sation, supra note 18, at 1788-91 (describing and defending necessary element of a suffi-
cient set (NESS) test of causation).
113. Cf Martin, On Weighting Causes, supra note 22, at 298 (If (A, B,...) were more
likely to cause a P-type result than (B, A .... ), then A is a more important cause of P than
is B.). The analysis presupposes that A is a necessary element of all sufficient sets contain-
ing A and B is a necessary element of all sufficient sets containing B. Where A or B
belong to a set that is sufficient to cause P without them they are no longer contingently
necessary causes of P.
114. See P. Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation 103-08 (1961) [hereinafter
P. Gardiner, Historical Explanation] (quoting R. Aron, Introduction i ]a Philosophie de
l'Histoire 165); Martin, On Weighting Causes, supra note 22, at 298-99.
115. 171 Mass. 536, 51 N.E. 1 (1898).
116. For a discussion of Stone as an illustration of the last wrongdoer rule, see supra
notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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cause of the fire damage to the plaintiff's property (P) than was Cas-
serly's discarding of a lit match (B) because the odds were greater that
what would have occurred absent B would have approximated P more
closely than what would have occurred absent A. The likelihood of a
substitute for B completing the set (A, ... ) was high relative to the likeli-
hood that a substitute for A would appear to complete the set (B, ... ).
The risk of fire created by the oil-soaked platform could have been real-
ized by many potential causes, including lightning, vandals, another per-
son's match or cigarette, sparks from a locomotive, or, perhaps, even a
package of fireworks dropped by a passenger leaping to board a train.
Absent the conditions created by the defendant, however, it is most likely
that Casserly's match would have burned out harmlessly, or that any fire
that it caused could have been extinguished easily before it spread to the
plaintiff's property.
By focusing on evidence of divisibility or likely substitutes, we have
partly rehabilitated Rizzo and Arnold's intuition that causal potency
matters. In making judgments about what would have happened absent
one or another cause we draw on our knowledge of what generally occurs
under similar circumstances. While Rizzo and Arnold do not explain
their understanding of risk fully, their notion of the probabilistic margi-
nal product 1 7 of a cause, A, seems to measure the probability that given
a set (A, B,...) some factor will occur to complete the set and cause
harm P.
Nevertheless, Analysis (D2) is not simply a looser, less disciplined,
nonquantified version of the Rizzo and Arnold analysis. There are three
important differences between the two approaches besides Rizzo and Ar-
nold's assumption that relative causal weight can be quantified with suffi-
cient precision, albeit still roughly, to justify their apparatus. First,
Analysis (D2) deals with singular causal statements, not with class-wide
judgments about risk creation. Our observations and knowledge of psy-
chology will lead us to believe, for instance, that falling in love has a
greater happiness-generating potency than does earning an A in a
course."1 Nonetheless, we might credit the analysis that Scott is happier
today than he was last week partly because his love life improved, but
more because he earned an A on his torts exam. We might believe this
particular causal weighting for a number of reasons. Perhaps Scott told
us so himself, and we believe that Scott is keenly self-aware of his feelings
and their causes, or at least we have no strong reason to doubt him. Al-
ternatively, on the basis of a single prior observation of Scott, his re-
117. Rizzo and Arnold define a probabilistic marginal product as "the increase in the
probability of a particular event (e.g., output or harm) brought about by either an addi-
tional unit of some input or the addition of an event or an act to a given situation." Rizzo
& Arnold, Causal Apportionment, supra note 12, at 1406 n.39; see also Rizzo & Arnold,
Reply to Critics, supra note 34, at 220 (offering similar definition).
118. Rizzo and Arnold are careful to state that their probability statements are not
derived merely by a count of actual frequencies. See Rizzo & Arnold, Reply to Critics,
supra note 34, at 220 & n.6; Rizzo, supra note 34, at 1013 & n.31.
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sponse to an A in contracts, we might believe that Scott defies the norm
typified by James. Finally, we might know that Scott perceives his father
as a larger-than-life figure who withholds his love and approval when his
son fails to live up to the near-impossible standards that he had set by his
own achievements-his father was first in his law school class and editor-
in-chief of the law review. For Scott, earning A's in his courses fulfills a
neurotic need to please his father and to compete successfully with him
that is greater than Scott's need for a happy love life.
Rizzo attempts to meet the objection that his probabilistic approach is
inapplicable to singular causal explanations in an article discussing his
"imputation theory of proximate cause. ' 119 There he argues that singu-
lar causal explanations, like probability statements, require a combina-
tion of universal generalizations, or general laws, and singular factual
statements. 120 He then invokes the covering-law model of explanation,
without calling it such, which he refers to as "the canonical form of
causal explanation." 121 According to the covering-law model, "the force
of any explanation consists in showing that the occurrence of the event to
be explained can be deduced and therefore could be predicted from our
knowledge of general laws and antecedent conditions."' 22
The defect in this argument is its assumption that the covering-law
model indeed states the consensus canonical form of causal explanation.
There is no such consensus among philosophers of history that historians
ought to adhere to the covering-law model in explaining events in the
past.' 2 3 Historians, who actually engage in the trade of explaining the
119. Rizzo, supra note 34, at 1007.
120. See id. at 1012-13.
121. Id. at 1013 (citing K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery 60 (1958)).
122. L. Mink, Philosophical Analysis and Historical Understanding, in Historical Un-
derstanding 118, 120 (B. Fay, E. Golob & R. Vann eds. 1987). Rizzo similarly writes:
"Finally, from the conjunction of universal and singular statements we can deduce the
particular event." Rizzo, supra note 34, at 1013.
123. The classic statement of the covering-law model is Carl G. Hempel's The Func-
tion of General Laws in History, 39 J. Phil. 36 (1942), reprinted in Theories of History 344
(P. Gardiner ed. 1959), although Karl Popper claims to be the model's originator. See
W. Dray, Philosophy, supra note 89, at 1-3. As Raymond Martin notes, the Hempel
essay "launched a debate that lasted over thirty years," and that "[d]uring this time phi-
losophy of history became virtually a one-issue field." R. Martin, The Past Within Us,
supra note 29, at 16. Important participants in the debate include: A. Danto, Analytical
Philosophy of History (1965); W. Dray, Philosophy, supra note 89; W.B. Gallie, Philoso-
phy and the Historical Understanding (1964); P. Gardiner, Historical Explanation, supra
note 114; M. Mandelbaum, The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge (1977); M. Murphey,
Our Knowledge of the Historical Past (1973); W.H. Walsh, An Introduction to Philoso-
phy of History (3d ed. 1967); M. White, Foundations of Historical Knowledge (1965);
Brodbeck, Explanation, Prediction, and "Imperfect" Knowledge, in 3 Minnesota Studies
in the Philosophy of Science 231 (H. Fiegl & G. Maxwell eds. 1962); Degler, Do Histori-
ans Use Covering Laws?, in Philosophy and History: A Symposium 205 (S. Hook ed.
1963); Donagan, Historical Explanation: The Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered, 4
Hist. & Theory 3 (1965); Hempel, Explanation in Science and in History, in Frontiers of
Science and Philosophy 7 (R. Colodny ed. 1962); L. Mink, The Autonomy of Historical
Understanding, in Historical Understanding 61 (B. Fay, E. Golob & R. Vann eds. 1987)
[hereinafter L. Mink, Autonomy]; Nagel, supra note 20.
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past, have greeted the debate over the covering-law model and the assim-
ilation of historical explanation to scientific explanation with a collective
shrug as they continue to write history without reference to the covering-
law apparatus. Certainly, we refer to scientific laws and to generaliza-
tions of human behavior when we talk about the causes of an event and
try to assess their importance, but we neither do so in the manner de-
scribed by Rizzo nor do we rely on such causal generalizations exclu-
sively. We may draw from a limited range of analogical instances, as we
did when we relied on Scott's response to his contracts grade. 124 We will
also look less to whether our explanations fulfill the requirements of sci-
entific explanation than to whether they help us to construct a coherent
and credible narrative.125
Analysis (D2) also differs from the Rizzo and Arnold approach be-
cause, like the normal causation inquiry in tort, it is completely ex post.
In thinking about the counterfactual possibilities had one of the causes
not occurred, we must consider causal potency, but we do so with knowl-
edge of how events unfolded. Rizzo and Arnold, on the other hand, cal-
culate their probabilities on the basis of facts existing at the time of the
wrong in conjunction with the general laws or theories prevailing at the
time of trial.1 26 This seems appropriate for the measurement of causal
potency at some point in time, but less helpful for unraveling the relative
importance of causes for the occurrence of a particular event. Rizzo and
Arnold's approach misses those instances where one cause proves to be
unexpectedly redundant, for example, where a repair shop's negligence in
fixing a car's brakes does not matter because of the driver's excessive
speed and failure to attempt to brake.
Finally, as noted above, Rizzo and Arnold conceive of harms as di-
chotomous. Either the harm in question occurs, or no harm occurs.
Martin's analysis, by contrast, allows us to consider what impact short of
the actual harm each cause would have had singly. In so doing, it re-
quires us to make comparative similarity judgments.
As if counterfactuals were not difficult enough, similarity is an espe-
cially elusive and troublesome concept. 27  Does Los Angeles "more
124. Cf. Pork, supra note 82, at 66-67 (drawing on single or limited number of analo-
gous events to justify claims modeled on analysis (D2)).
125. There is a considerable body of literature on historical narrative. A good place to
start is L. Mink, Autonomy, supra note 123, at 61.
126. See Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment, supra note 12, at 1408. In their de-
scription of the facts existing at the time, they do consider, however, the high probability
of certain subsequent events. See id.
127. Nelson Goodman has hardly a good word to say for similarity. He writes:
Similarity, I submit, is insidious. And if the association here with invidious
comparison is itself invidious, so much the better. Similarity, ever ready to
solve philosophical problems and overcome obstacles, is a pretender, an impos-
tor, a quack. It has, indeed, its place and its uses, but is more often found where
it does not belong, professing powers it does not possess.
... [O]nly recently have I come to realize how often I have encountered this
false friend and had to undo his work.
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closely approximate" New York City or San Diego?' 28 One's answer
will depend on the points of resemblance that are deemed to matter. Los
Angeles and New York City both have populations numbering in the
millions, both have black mayors, and both are centers of finance and the
entertainment industry. But if we make climate, history, culture, and
ethnic composition the basis of comparison, we would probably conclude
that Los Angeles more closely resembles San Diego. The grounds for
comparison might be individual and personal: "I met the (momentary)
love of my life when I lived in Los Angeles, as I did again when I later
lived in San Diego, but in New York I was alone and despondent." Or
they may be ineffable, similarity determinations based on the feel or
rhythm of the cities, for example.
Similarity judgments, in other words, are contextual. They depend on
one's point of view and purpose. An illustration of Nelson Goodman's
demonstrates this well:
[S]uppose we have three glasses, the first two filled with colorless liq-
uid, the third with a bright red liquid. I might be likely to say the first
two are more like each other than either is like the third. But it hap-
pens that the first glass is filled with water and the third with water
colored by a drop of vegetable dye, while the second is filled with hy-
drochloric acid-and I am thirsty. 129
Law gives a context and a purpose to the comparative similarity judg-
ments required by Analysis (D2). We are not asked to compare every-
thing about our hypothetical A-less or B-less worlds with everything
about the actual world. Our inquiry is focused, instead, on a comparison
of the harm actually suffered and the harms, if any, that would have been
suffered in our imaginatively constructed alternative histories.
Even given a focus by law, comparative similarity judgments will often
be vague and imprecise. Often cognizable harms are composites of many
separate harms. Thus, our analysis will sometimes involve comparisons
of complex pictures in which each hypothetical outcome resembles differ-
ent aspects of the actual outcome. In such cases, subjective judgments
regarding selection and weighting can lead different decisionmakers to
dissimilar similarity judgments. 30 Nevertheless, we can and do make
such judgments. Indeed, we must. Even Goodman, while characterizing
similarity as "undependable," acknowledges also that it is
"indispensable."''
How would we go about applying step (3) of Analysis (D2)--"had B
Goodman, Seven Strictures on Similarity, in Experience & Theory 19, 19 (L. Foster & J.
Swanson eds. 1970) [hereinafter Goodman, Strictures].
128. For a similar example, see D. Lewis, Counterfactuals, supra note 103, at 92.
129. Goodman, Strictures, supra note 127, at 28.
130. But see Martin, The Past Within Us, supra note 29, at 81 (claiming that determi-
nations of closer approximation are based purely on factual considerations).
131. Goodman, Strictures, supra note 127, at 27; see also D. Lewis, Counterfactuals
and Comparative Possibility in 2 Philosophical Papers 3, 6 (1986) [hereinafter D. Lewis,
Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibility].
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not occurred, something would have occurred which more closely ap-
proximates P than had A not occurred"? 32 Martin begins with the sim-
plest case, Analysis (Dl), which is merely a special case of (D2). 33
Recall that in the example of the faculty vote, had Professor Y not voted
for the proposal, something would have occurred which more closely ap-
proximates P, passage of the proposal by a bare majority of twenty-one
votes, than had Professor X not voted for the proposal. In fact, virtually
the same thing would have occurred, passage of the proposal by a bare
majority of twenty-one votes, albeit with the support of Professor Z in-
stead of Professor Y. Had Professor X not voted for the proposal, how-
ever, something that less closely approximates P would have occurred,
namely, a vote one short of the majority needed for adoption of the
proposal.
Some comparisons for Analysis (D2) may be quantitative. To borrow
another example from Martin, we might suppose that Professor X con-
trols a block of five votes (she holds four proxies or exerts great influence
among her colleagues), while Professor Y controls only her own vote.'
Had either professor not voted for the proposal, it would not have been
adopted. However, we can also say that had Professor Y not voted for
the proposal, something that more closely approximates P would have
occurred-the measure would have received twenty votes-than had
Professor X not voted for the proposal, in which case it would have re-
ceived only sixteen votes. Thus Professor X's vote was a more important
cause of the faculty's adoption of the proposal than was Professor Y's
vote.
Typically, however, we will not be able to resolve our relative similar-
ity comparisons quantitatively. The causal comparison problems that we
are likely to encounter will usually bear a closer resemblance to the prob-
lem of weighting the causes of James' happiness. Such judgments are
doubtless more subjective and vague than simple vote counts. Yet, it is a
subjectivity and vagueness that we can cope with reasonably well. Cer-
tainly lawyers, for whom the business of applying and distinguishing pre-
cedent is part of their stock in trade, should see an old friend, not a
"pretender, an impostor, [or] a quack" in the notion of similarity. 35
Similarity is ultimately only so vague, and we can often overcome its
imprecision sufficiently to talk intelligibly. 36 David Lewis, who unlike
Goodman is a friend of comparative similarity, reminds us that there are
boundaries to the imprecision of similarity and that "[n]ot anything
132. K. Martin, The Past Within Us, supra note 29, at 78.
133. See id. at 79.
134. See id. at 80. For purposes of this example, Professor Z does not automatically
vote the converse of Professor Y. For a somewhat different treatment, see Martin, On
Weighting Causes, supra note 22, at 293-94.
135. Goodman, Strictures, supra note 127, at 19. For a critical discussion of "similar-
ity" in a legal context, see Moore, Precedent, Induction, and Ethical Generalization in
Precedent in Law 183 (L. Goldstein ed. 1987).




Martin's Analysis (D2) provides a coherent interpretation of relative
causal importance. It appeals to our intuition that a cause's importance
is related to the contribution or the difference that it made. Yet, it re-
quires a difficult inquiry into counterfactual possibilities and comparative
similarity. Moreover, the subjective judgments of comparative similarity
that it requires belie Analysis (D2)'s pretensions of providing a purely
factual analysis of causal weight. Finally, it fails to capture another
meaning that we sometimes intend when we speak of more important
causes: that of greater responsibility.
F. Judgments of Relative Responsibility or Proximate Cause
Finally, we might say that the more important of two causes is the one
that was more responsible for their effect. Here the term "responsible"
means something other than "important" in the factual sense of making
the largest contribution or making the biggest difference toward the oc-
currence of the event. It is instead the statement of a moral and legal
conclusion that a particular cause ought to be held more accountable
than other causes for the effect. 138 It is an unabashedly normative inter-
pretation of more important cause, and it bears a close kinship to tradi-
tional notions of proximate cause.
Like traditional proximate cause analysis, this approach states no pre-
cise rule for weighting responsibility, but instead identifies several factors
to be considered.1 39 And as in traditional proximate cause analysis, the
formulations of factors to be weighed and the emphasis to be placed on
particular factors will vary and shift depending on who is framing the
analysis, on community mores, and on the context of the inquiry.
"There is in truth little to guide us other than common sense."14 0
We have come a long way to be told that these judgments are a matter
of common sense. Moreover, due to its circularity, such an approach
risks relinquishing any critical or evaluative stance regarding the
factfinders' performance. If we tell factfinders to apply common sense
and community norms in assigning causal weight, then their assignments
are at once a response to their charge and data that reveal the norms and
sense of the community. How, then, are we to criticize the factfinders'
choices? Can we do any better? We can, at any rate, take note of various
137. D. Lewis, Counterfactuals, supra note 103, at 93.
138. Cf C.B. McCullagh, Justifying Historical Descriptions 216-25 (1984) (describing
historians' use of similar understanding of most important cause).
139. As Judge Andrews wrote in his Palsgraf dissent, "[t]here are no fixed rules to
govern our judgment. There are simply matters of which we may take account." Pal-
sgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 347, 354, 162 N.E. 99, 101, 104 (1928) (An-
drews, J., dissenting). Some commentators have attempted to create a precise system of
rules to govern proximate cause analysis, but the consensus view is that those attempts all
failed. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 21, at 279 (focusing especially on the writings of
Joseph Beale and Charles Carpenter); G. White, supra note 2, at 92-102.
140. Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 354, 162 N.E. at 104 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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formulations of this multifactor analysis. The Uniform Act instructs the
factfinder to consider both the nature of each party's conduct and the
causal relationship between their conduct and the harm."' The com-
ment to Section 2 of the Act, which addresses the method of apportion-
ment, counsels consideration of such matters as: whether the conduct
involved knowing or inadvertent risk-taking; the "magnitude of the risk
created;" the purpose and value of the conduct; "the actor's superior or
inferior capacities, and... the particular circumstances;" as well as the
relative remoteness of the conduct from the harm.'42 Richard Wright,
who is a proponent of comparative responsibility, offers a similar list of
factors to which he adds "the objective foreseeability and reasonableness
of the risk,... and the policies that underlie the various categories of
tortious behavior."' 43
To these formulations we should add Judge Andrews' classic descrip-
tion of proximate cause analysis in Palsgraf:
There are some hints that may help us. The proximate cause, involved
as it may be with many other causes, must be, at the least, something
without which the event would not happen. The court must ask itself
whether there was a natural and continuous sequence between cause
and effect. Was the one a substantial factor in producing the other?
Was there a direct connection between them, without too many inter-
vening causes? Is the effect of cause on result not too attentuated [sic]?
Is the cause likely, in the usual judgment of mankind, to produce the
result? Or by the exercise of prudent foresight could the result be fore-
seen? Is the result too remote from the cause, and here we consider
remoteness in time and space. 14
Unlike the other interpretations of more important cause, this ap-
proach is expressly normative. It evaluates causes and determines their
importance by extracausal criteria. These criteria include value judg-
ments about the merits and demerits of the actors, their conduct, and the
purposes sought thereby, as well as of the adversely affected interest.
More fundamentally, however, our selection of the more accountable
cause may serve any number of ends and reflect a variety of assumptions
about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of different sorts of conduct.1 45 For
141. Unif. Comparative Fault Act § 2(b), 12 U.L.A. 41, 48 (Supp. 1991).
142. Id. at 48 comment. Section 2(b) itself states that the factfinder "shall consider
both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal relation
between the conduct and the damages claimed." Id § 2(b).
143. Wright, Allocating Liability, supra note 19, at 1144.
144. Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 354, 162 N.E. at 104 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
145. The most notable discussion of the normative character of judgments of causal
responsibility is William Dray's essay on A.J.P. Taylor's revisionist account of the causes
of World War II and the debate that Taylor's book sparked. Dray identifies five causal
paradigms that are used in the debate. See W. Dray, Perspectives on History 69-96
(1980) (chapter 4 A Controversy over Causer A.J.P. Taylor and the Origins of the Second
World War essay originally published as Dray, Concepts of Causation in A.J.P. Taylor's
Account of the Origins of the Second World War, 17 Hist. & Theory 149 (1978)) [hereinaf-
ter W. Dray, Perspectives]. According to Dray, historians accord special status to a par-
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example, in deciding whether a wrongful intervening act supersedes a
prior act of negligence, we might focus on the state of mind of the actor
in saying that the deliberate harmdoing by the rapists in Hines v. Gar-
rett, 46 or the thieves in Brower v. New York Central & Hudson River
Railroad, 47 was a more important cause. We might make this causal
apportionment either because we believe that the intention to bring about
the result is a marker of more important causes,"' or because we believe
that intentional harmdoing is generally riskier, and therefore more un-
reasonable, than mere negligence. 4 9 Or we might, instead, focus on our
judgments of what behaviors are normal or abnormal under the circum-
stances and ask whether the criminal acts were so abnormal as to identify
them as the most important cause or so expected and foreseeable as to
relegate them to the status of mere condition and to designate the failure
to anticipate the crimes and safeguard against them as the more impor-
tant cause.' 50 Or, more probably, we might combine several notions of
accountability in determining which was the more responsible cause.
We can articulate our paradigms and norms more clearly, but in the
end we take a leap of faith and make our judgment of responsibility. The
last word in this regard is Judge Andrews' who wrote that our notion of
proximate cause is grounded in "convenience," "public policy," and "a
rough sense of justice," and that ultimately the issue was a matter of
"practical politics." 15'
ticular cause for any of the following five reasons: (1) because the actor intended the
result, see id. at 71; (2) because it interfered with the settled state of affairs, or disrupted
ongoing processes (it was, in other words, abnormal), see id. at 80; (3) because it was
active and made things happen, or compelled other people's responses, rather than being
a response to others' acts, see id. at 82; (4) because it made it possible for things to
happen, either by creating an opportunity or by failing to constrain some other actor, see
id. at 85; or (5) because it made the result inevitable, see id. at 88, 92-93. Dray persua-
sively argues that at least the first four paradigms are "value-impregnated." Id. at 94 and
passim.
Hugh Stretton has also discussed the value-laden nature of this process of selecting
certain causes for emphasis out of a lacework of causal candidates. He notes that often
one set of causes is identified as most important not merely because of the perceived
relationship between the causes and the thing to be explained, but because of the impor-
tance the historian places on the other "by-products" of those causes. H. Stretton, The
Political Sciences 52-80 (1969).
146. 131 Va. 125, 108 S.E. 690 (1921). This case is described supra at text accompany-
ing note 72.
147. 91 N.J.L. 190, 103 A. 166 (1918). This case is described supra at text accompany-
ing note 73.
148. For instance, Hart and Honor6 observe that "intended consequences can never be
too remote." H.L.A. Hart & T. Honor6, supra note 11, at 43; cf. W. Dray, Perspectives,
supra note 145, at 71-78 (similarly describing first causal paradigm).
149. I owe this point to Ronald Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity School of Law.
150. See H.L.A. Hart & T. Honor6, supra note 11, at 33-41; cf. W. Dray, Perspectives,
supra note 145, at 80-81 (abnormalist paradigm of causal importance), 85-86 (more im-
portant causes "'let' . . . things happen," or fail to stop destructive forces).
151. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 352, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1928) (An-
drews, J., dissenting).
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III. THE POTENTIAL OF COMPARATIVE CAUSATION
A. Where We Are Now
Currently, the concept of comparative causation is underdeveloped.
Many courts discuss the question offhandedly. They note that causal
comparison is called for in a particular case, but they fail to articulate
their understanding of what the comparison entails. They simply in-
struct that the damages be apportioned according to the relative causal
effects or contributions of the various acts. 152 The notable exceptions are
courts in those states which apply all.or part of the Uniform Act, but
even these courts do little more than quote or paraphrase the language of
the Act or its comment on apportionment.1 53 The typical pattern jury
instructions for comparative causation jurisdictions are similarly
unhepful.
152. See, e.g., Atwater v. Matanuska Elec. Ass'n, Inc., 727 P.2d 774, 777 (Alaska
1986) ("liability should be apportioned to the violator in proportion to the extent which
his violation caused the accident"); Auton v. Logan Landfill, Inc., 105 111. 2d 537, 546,
475 N.E.2d 817, 820 (1984) ("the comparative-fault principle will operate to reduce
plaintiff's recovery in the amount of the damages which the trier of fact determines the
plaintiff has caused by his conduct"); Sandifer Motors, Inc. v. City of Roeland Park, 6
Kan. App. 2d 308, 318, 628 P.2d 239, 248 (1981) ("where tort liability is predicated on
conduct less culpable than 'intentional' the general rule is to compare fault and causa-
tion"); Winge v. Minnesota Transfer Ry., 294 Minn. 399, 403, 201 N.W.2d 259, 263
(1972) ("[O]ur comparative negligence statute.. . now requires a comparison of relative
fault. While the statute speaks of a comparison of negligence, in application what is
really compared... is the relative contribution of each party's negligence to the damage
in a causal sense."); Cash v. Otis Elevator Co., 210 Mont. 319, 330-31, 684 P.2d 1041,
1047 (1984) ("The jury is properly charged to find... the percentage that the conduct of
each negligent party contributed to the cause."); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118
N.H. 802, 813, 395 A.2d 843, 850 (1978) ("jury must weigh the plaintiff's misconduct, if
any, and reduce the amount of damages by the percentage that the plaintiff's misconduct
contributed to cause his loss or injury"); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414,
427 (Tex. 1984) ("The trier of fact is to compare the harm caused by the defective prod-
uct with the harm caused by the negligence of other defendants, any settling tortfeasors
and the plaintiff."), quoted and followed in Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 111 Idaho 536,
540, 726 P.2d 648, 652 (1985); Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1303-04
(Utah 1981) ("The defense in a products liability case, where both defect and misuse
contribute to cause the damaging event, will limit the plaintiff's recovery to that portion
of his damages equal to the percentage of the cause contributed by the product defect.").
153. See e.g., Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 721 (Ky. 1984) (judicially adopting
section 2 of the Uniform Act); Watson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 469 So. 2d
967, 973-74 (La. 1985) (looking to section 2 of the Uniform Act and its comment in the
absence of state statutory guidance and applying that analysis to the case; one of the more
thoughtful decisions).
154. Like the court decisions, the jury instructions direct that the factfinder compare
causal contribution, but they typically give no guidance as to how to make such a com-
parison or address the intended meaning of relative causal importance.
A typical example is Illinois pattern jury instruction 400.11, entitled "Products Liabil-
ity-Modified General Verdict Form-Assumption of Risk-Verdict for Plaintiff." Ill.
Sup. Ct. Comm. on Jury Instructions in Civ. Cases, Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil
[IPI]: "A" Series Instructions on Comparative Negligence, Strict Liability in Tort 400.11
(2d ed. Special Supp. 1986). After asking the jury to specify the plaintiff's total amount
of damages, the verdict form states: "[s]econd: Assuming that 100% represents the total
combined responsibility of the plaintiff and of the defendant[s] [and of other persons] for
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Even if courts gave clear and precise guidance to factfinders charged
with making causal apportionments, we would have reason to doubt that
we actually knew what those factfinders did in determining relative
causal responsibility. One problem is simply a question of what jurors
understand when instructed to make such comparisons. The more seri-
ous problem is our need to understand more about the psychology of
causal attribution. Are jurors prone, for instance, to fall prey to what
Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross call the "resemblance criterion," which
leads to the ascription of causal significance to causes that resemble their
effects? 5' When they ascribe relative causal responsibility, do they as-
sume, for instance, that big harms result from causes that similarly ap-
pear big relative to other causes? Is an apportionment method that
focuses on some other factor, such as negligence or fault, any less prone
to this attributive fallacy? Until we know more about how factfinders
reason to these decisions, any effort to describe the current practice or to
improve it will be seriously hampered.
B. Where We Should Be: A Modest Proposal
This Article is hardly an unqualified brief for comparative causation.
plaintiff's damages, we find that the percentage attributable solely to plaintiff's assump-
tion of risk that was a proximate cause of plaintiff's [injury] [or] [damage] is - percent
(%)." Id.
Texas instructions speak instead of "percentage[s] of causation," and its verdict forms
ask jurors to apportion such percentages of causation to the various parties or products
that have contributed to the accident. State Bar of Tex., Jury Charges Under Amended
Rule 277 PJC 71.09 (1989).
Iowa juries receive similarly vague guidance. Iowa Civil Jury Instruction 400.2 follows
the blended approach of the Uniform Act, but assumes that the meaning of causal com-
parison is self-evident. The instruction simply states:
COMPARATIVE FAULT. Damages may be the fault of more than one person. In
comparing fault, you should consider all of the surrounding circumstances as
shown by the evidence, together with the conduct of the [plaintiff] [defend-
ant(s)] [third party defendant(s)] [persons who have been released], and the ex-
tent of the causal relation between their conduct and the damages claimed. You
should then determine what percentage, if any, each person's fault contributed
to the damages.
Iowa State Bar Ass'n, Special Comm. on Unif. Ct. Instructions, Iowa Civil Jury Instruc-
tions 400.2 (1991).
In Kentucky, which also follows the Uniform Act, jurors are instructed to allocate
percentages of total fault and are simply told that, in making those allocations, "you shall
consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal
relation between his [or her] conduct and the damages claimed." J. Palmore, Kentucky
Instructions to Juries §§ 14.08, 14.09, 49.02, 49.03 (4th ed. 1989).
Washington, which similarly has adopted the Uniform Act, neglects to include in its
pattern jury instructions a definition of "fault" that encompasses both fault and causation
concepts. See Wash. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Jury Instructions, Washington Pattern Jury
Instructions, Civil [WPI 3d] WPI 45.22 (Question No. 6); WPI 45.23 (Question No. 7);
WPI 110.31 (Question No. 6) (3d ed. 1989). Its only reference to comparative causation
is buried in the comment to its contributory negligence instruction. See id. at WPI 11.01
comment.




While the criticism that we cannot talk meaningfully about more and less
important causes is wrong--clearly we can and we do make such state-
ments, and they are understood as more than gibberish-such talk is
fraught with difficulty. Because of the multiple meanings of the notion of
greater causal importance, such talk is likely ambiguous unless we make
explicit our grounds for comparison. Even if we do, however, as the fore-
going analysis demonstrates, the determination of relative causal impor-
tance can be cumbersome, unpredictable, and subjective.
We should, therefore, use comparative causation sparingly. Where we
can base apportionment of damages on judgments of comparative negli-
gence without reference to causation, there is no need to substitute the
complicated task of causal comparison. 5 6 Where, however, the standard
of liability denies us commensurable faults to compare, as in strict prod-
ucts liability cases, 157 we ought to apportion on the basis of causal
weight.
What approach should we use? Each approach is deficient. The prob-
abilistic causation approach distracts our attention from the causes of the
singular event at issue viewed ex post and, instead, unjustifiably shifts it
toward an analysis of ex ante causal potency and the causes of classes of
events. The search for occasioning causes relies on assumed but unexam-
ined extracausal notions of causal importance, and it unduly weights
first-in-time causes. Martin's Analysis (DI), or indispensability analysis,
is relatively simple, but it is not likely to fit many real cases. His Analy-
sis (D2), or comparative counterfactual similarity analysis, has greater
real-world application than Analysis (DI), but it is hardly simple. It re-
quires that we use two difficult and vague concepts---counterfactuals and
comparative similarity. Finally, the relative responsibility, or proximate
cause, approach enables us to draw on normative intuitions about causal
importance, but it tends to leave those norms unidentified and is unpre-
dictable and undisciplined.
Nevertheless, the last two approaches, Martin's Analysis (D2) and the
comparative responsibility or accountability approach, both capture im-
portant aspects of what we ordinarily mean when we talk about causal
weight. There are problems with the use of either approach, and many of
those problems remain if we use them in tandem, but their problems are
not so grave as to outweigh the value of causal comparisons in some
cases, or their value as the best means to make those comparisons.
Martin's Analysis (D2) of most important cause reflects an important
element of our understanding of causation: that we measure the impor-
tance of a cause by the contribution or difference that it made. Clearly,
156. Of course, comparative negligence may suffer from many of the same infirmities
or from different, but equally troubling, ones. For one discussion of problems of appor-
tionment under comparative negligence, see Pearson, supra note 21.
157. I refer, at any rate, to those cases, such as manufacturing defect cases, where the
standard truly is strict.
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in everyday life we judge acts by the difference that they made, and we
should in applying our liability rules, also.
As described above, however, Analysis (D2) depends on two difficult
concepts-counterfactuals and comparative similarity. Counterfactuals
are difficult and vague. They are no better than our knowledge about the
world, from which we must draw our counterfactual inferences. Many
multiple cause cases are difficult because our knowledge is so limited.
We are hampered by the problem of causal uncertainty or "irresolu-
tion." '158 Where the plaintiff's alcohol-impaired reflexes and the defend-
ant's defective steering column combine to cause a collision, how sure
can we be about whether the plaintiff would have arrived home safely
absent the one or the other cause, or about what manner of harm he
would have suffered because of the remaining cause? Further, we couple
our imprecise counterfactuals with vague and subjective similarity judg-
ments. Nevertheless, the process will often give us a good sense of rela-
tive causal weight.
It will also often give us equally weighted causes because, in many
cases, each cause will have made all the difference between the harm that
occurred and no harm occurring at all. That is not a failing of the analy-
sis. Under its terms, there is simply no basis for distinguishing between
causes in those cases. In other instances, Analysis (D2) will weight one
cause more heavily than another not because of the greater contribution
to harm made by that cause, but because of the accident of overdetermi-
nation or a near substitute for the second cause. These instances raise the
problem of "moral luck."' 59 Thomas Nagel describes moral luck as that
element of our moral assessment of someone's conduct that depends on
chance circumstances beyond the actor's control."6 The differential
treatment given by Analysis (D2) to causes that have near or complete
substitutes and causes that do not forces us to consider what role acci-
dental factors that are extrinsic either to the purpose or the conduct of a
particular actor should play in our evaluation and treatment of that con-
duct under our liability rules.
An analysis that emphasizes the difference that a particular cause
made may overemphasize the effect of moral luck and ignore other nor-
mative grounds for ascribing greater responsibility to one cause instead
of another. The Uniform Act approach, in turn, misses the emphasis on
how much contribution or difference a cause made, unless we couple it
with an analysis like (D2). Consequently, we need to combine Analysis
158. The latter term is Mark Kelman's. See Kelman, supra note 21, at 606.
159. For an examination of the concept of "moral luck," see T. Nagel, Moral Luck, in
Mortal Questions 24 (1979) [hereinafter T. Nagel, Moral Luck]. For discussions of
Nagel's essay in the context of causation in law, see Robinson, Probabilistic Causation,
supra note 32, at 789-90; Thomson, The Decline of Cause, 76 Geo. L.J. 137, 139-50
(1987).
160. "Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his
control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can
be called moral luck." T. Nagel, Moral Luck, supra note 159, at 26.
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(D2) with the comparative responsibility approach exemplified in the
Uniform Act. How much emphasis we place on each approach will de-
pend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case and cannot
be reduced to a simple algebraic formula.
The strengths and weaknesses of the comparative responsibility ap-
proach both flow from its use of a multifactor test. Multifactor analysis
of this sort is inherently vague and imprecise. Compared to it, our judg-
ments of comparative similarity under Martin's Analysis (D2) seem rela-
tively bounded, directed, and objective. The comparative responsibility
approach is often unpredictable since it is dependent on subjective
choices of selection and weight. Worse still, such multifactor analysis is
remarkably manipulable. An array of factors to be weighed and bal-
anced can hide a multitude of normative judgments, prejudices, or sins.
Yet, we have considerable experience with multifactor approaches to
problems in law and to other judgments that we make in everyday life.' 6'
Moreover, its open-endedness is at least as much a boon as a detriment.
The comparative responsibility approach conforms to our experience
that we have a variety of grounds on which to ascribe causal importance.
What we sacrifice in predictability and precision we gain in pragmatic
flexibility and the ability to give expression to multiple understandings of
causal importance.
When we combine the two approaches we achieve an imperfect but
serviceable test of causal importance that allows us to do rough justice in
apportioning liability and captures most of what we mean in saying that
one cause was more important than another.
161. As described above, the proximate cause inquiry involves a multifactor analysis.
See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 442 (1965) ("Considerations Important in Determining Whether an Intervening Force
is a Superseding Cause"). Those commentators who have reframed the proximate cause
analysis as one involving duty retain the multifactor character of the analysis. See. e.g.,
Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 Tex. L. Rev. 42, 58 (1962); Thode, The
Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical Case to Determine Cause in Fact, 46 Tex. L Rev.
423, 429-30 (1968); Thode, Tort Analysis Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Ra-
tional Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 1, 26-30. The
negligence standard of reasonable care is similarly "open-ended" and requires considera-
tion of multiple factors. Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3
J. Legal Stud. 257, 258 (1974). In tort law alone, we see several other examples of such
multifactor analysis. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433 (1965) ("Considera-
tions Important in Determining Whether Negligent Conduct is Substantial Factor in Pro-
ducing Harm"); id. § 520 ("Abnormally Dangerous Activities"); id. § 767 ("Factors in
Determining Whether Interference [With a Contract] is Improper"); it. §§ 826-28 (fac-
tors in determining liability for private nuisance).
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